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The produotl0.l'l ot iron 1n Alllerlca began1n a limited 
area east, ot theA.lleghoniea, centered around Philadelphia, 
which was also apr1nc1palpol"t of entry for rore1gniron. 
AS early 48 1750, p~lc1ng was done on. a rudimentary basing 
point structure. APparently, all prices on domestic 1z-on 
were quoted on a Phlladelph1a base and were hIgher in t:he 
outlying terr1to'ry where their-on was actua.l1y made. Tbe 
manui'actu1"era absorbed freight in order to move their iron 
to the central market, where it competedwlth foreign iron.1 
with the tremendou. growth of iron and steel capaclt,. 
at Pittsburgh,. 'Philadelphia did not keep :Lts position .a a 
baG., and by the middle or the 1880'a, tim-e •• teal plant. 
in New aer.8'Y and Eastern pennsl1vania began quot1ngprlce8 
from the carnesi. tlanb inPittaburgh. Th1a marlca the :real 
beginnblS of the basing pamt s,.stem ot prleingin the 
'United states.2 This prlcingme1ihod. slowly extended to other 
steel product. and producers through the med1tnn of various 
poola, tradeagr •• menta, and trade associations. B7 the 
e.r11 1900f., the basing point slst •• was 1n general use 
iIf _. 
1. Tbe.Ba.1ns,(.')intproblem, Tempoira17 National Economic 
committee l~onograpJi 42, {Washington, 1941),P4t 41 
2. Fr1tz .*.OhlUP' The Ba81nfPOint sllteJR, (Philadelphia, 
1949), pp. 17-20. Prank. tette~, '&it Basing point 
Pricing.· American Eeonom1caevl.w. xxxv1ii (194S), 
pp. 815 ... 16. !'rolessor 'eiter mentions that the German 
Steel cartel practiced baaing point pricing intbe 
1870t ., and euggeats that the American companies 
probaoll patterned on this model. 
blthe at.el lnduatrr under-the lead.r'8hip of the Unl,ted 
Itat, •• ste.l eorporatl0n.1 Thus, the t1r.t 1ru3.u.>trr-wlde us. 
0'£ delivered pricing occUrred 'in th. at.fiJ1 industry under 
the old "Pltt'sbu,rgh~plUs8Y8tem •• 
Shol'tly after 1nduBtllJ'-w1de u's. of delivered pricing 
had been ac111eved in the steel industry, tht Portland cement 
Industry "dopted a very8btl1ar pr1cSns formula. This was 
probably because tbe t1nlt.~ statea steel corporat1on" had 
become the largeat, single producer of Portland Cement 1n 
tbl. count17_ Unl1ke the steel 1nd\\atI'7. however, thecemen't 
1nduat17 adopted a multipl. baaing point • .,.tem and became 
the fs.ret 1ndust!'7 in America to use more than one baaing 
polnt.3 
After the adoption of dellvered pricing by the producer. 
of Portlatld cement, tbe use of baaing pointe spread quite 
rapSd11 to ovh&r industrie.. tittle 1ntoftDat1on regard1ng 
the apr.adot del1vel-ed pric:ing 18 ava.1lable. but at lesat 
twent,. industrie. ba.veu.ed the 878tem." 
Legala.,ct1on against the basing p·o1nt 818tem began in 
1920. wben Western steel consumers, protested to the Federal 
Trade Commie.ion tbatlJteel price. were too high and .ere 
be 1ng fixed b7collua1ve pl'act lees. 5 Sinee that t 1me,court 
.. 
1. Machlup •.. 017 c1t., p. so. 
2. Ibid •• P. . .• ~ 
3. fiG." 
4. l1)1(i".. See alao tor a list of industries which are now 
.U8mg,or have na.d. the basing point syste •• 
S. Ibid.,. P.66. 
---... 
aetlonon thllu,s'Q.eba,8 been almo.t cont1nuo'l1'. Pinally. 
on Apr11 .6,1~'6,j the supre.. eourtbandld,(i.olm ,a d •. olt 10ll 
i~ , 
in ,. • •• ,againat the uso ot a.livered pricing b7the pro- " 
duoera otPortland cem.nt.1'lble ca.e, it 1. thought b7 
many, w111 have the etff)ot ot making the UI. ot baaing pointe 
in an,.1ndu,at17111ega.l. More reoently,' in the" 8pr1l'18 ot 
1949. the Supreme OOtiJrtba.nded·down a decision against the 
uae ot delivered pr1c1ngbl the makers or rigid. .teal con-
dUlt.2 Tbl. ca.8 hal bad the eft.e'or strengthening the, 
bel..le,t that ultimatel,. b •• ing po1nt pricing it.elf will be 
declared illegal if 1tcan ,be pl'o •• n the resu.lt of cODsp1raq.1 
At the preaentt1me, the eongress of the United sta/tes 1. con-
sidering various proposals for clar1t71n.g the atatul of the 
basing po1nt .'Jetea. .A.yet. nothing oonclusive baab.en 
decided. 
While it 18atl11uncerta1n what the .:act legal Itatu. 
of baaing point pricing w111 be., 80 •• induatr1 ••• inoluding 
the ste.l Snduatrr., bav. abandoned the baaing point 8.,St •• 
and are now' prlc1ng on an ent1re17 different baall. 
SOOPE OF THIS S·TtJI)y 
This stud,. w111 be cont1ned to adiacu8sionot the 
pOlsible 1mpllca.tlo118 of the abandonment of the basinS point 
n 
1. Federal Trade COmmission v. The Cement Institute, 3~ u.S. 
683 (IOtb" ·68 s .. dti.' 'ml .. ' " 
2. Federal Trade Comml'~1.pn. v. Tria,n6,le COpduit and cable, 
Die. eti. al. '1tilidDoult COur\ or APpear., 1&9 Fea I! 
l'S( !9IS,.The high. court dec1sion 18 recorded 1n 1949 
and 11 not yet available. 
3. of. NewR8Eubll.c, lul.,. 18 .. 1949, p. 23. 
178'.. otprl.c1nsb7 the It,.'.11n4u,8t17 lnutah. FOP purpo .•• ' 
of compar1aon. a rather d.tal1ed dlscus.ion of the basinS 
point system w111 be 1ncluded, and to clarity the present 
legal .tatuB of deliveZ'fld pl'lc1ng. some court history wl11 
be summarized. without doubt, a new prlcing polio7 1n the 
steel indu.stry w111 have 80me rathor farr'hch1ng effeot_, 
both on other induatJ;'l •• and upon the econont1 at th1sreglon. 
These possible erfe·cts w111 be discus.ed. 
PURPOSE OF' THE STUDY 
The abandonment ot theba.1ng po1nt 87atem ot priCing 
by the steel hldnstr'f creates many problems as to the ad3u.t-
menta which .111 be nee ••• ar.,. under thene. prle1ngs18tem. 
It w11l be the.1m ot th1l study to Asoertain the posalble 
nature and extent ot thcu.e adjustment., and their errect" 
both upon the Utah •. teel Industry and upontbe economyot 
thlsar.... Since the abandomnent or bas1ngpoint pricing 
lsa rather recent development, this the.la, ot neee'ss1t1, 
will be 1n the na,ture of a predl.etion .a to 80me ot the 
poss1bl.economlc 1mp11,catlon8ot th1a actlon. 
METHOD OF ADALYSIS 
Not enough'b1m-e has elapsed since t'he ateel 1ndustl'7 
abandoned the basins point system to make an,. important 
decisiona on the basu ot an empirical stud,._ Fo,r thi. 
reason, th ... thc,dot thuatttdy must be cont1nedto ad •• 
termination ot the possible implicationa through the \le. of 
economic ana1781a. Although much has been written about 
the pos.sible effects· and attendent adJus'tments since the 
abolition of delivered pricing became a p~ss1bl11tY', little 
or nothing has 'been said about what mie)lt be the effects on 
a particular industry" and the a.onsequent effects on the econ-
omy ora. pa.rt1cu.la%' area. J:o"or this :reason, the use of ex1st-
ing material will baeonf"ined to those stateme.nts whioh can 
beapp11ed to this pa:rt1eular study. 
5 
'fBi BASDIG pomT SYSTEM 
BAmtGROtmD 
There are oertain common charaeter1atlc. amongthe1n. 
4uatr1 •• whleb bave adopted. a:ratemotdellvertaprle1ng.1 
NO attempt will be made atthie tim. to 8ay which of th ••• 
characteristic. are caua .... nd which .ttecta of the baling 
point By.tem. such a discussion can be,llol't profitably under-
taken later :in thi. paper. 
Firat, 1nnear17 every industry, freight eoatsare an 
important elementot the delivered prioe.2 It laneCellUJllry 
'that'th!. 'be 'the ca8Et tor an7 commodit7 where the price 1. 
"""'''"'qiiot'e(r-'ori''i''''aellv'ered bail.'. tilreight coats war. trivial. 
the buyer. would not be vel',. concerned about the point of pur-
chase, and any scheme to equali.e freight costa would, be 
superfluous. 
Second. the industriesarEt usually characterized by a 
high degree of geographic concentration. ot production and a 
l1m1ted number of producera.3 Thi. characteristic 18 moat 
eal117 •• en in the steel industry. Bere, productive capacity 
18 located at the lource or one ot the raw material. rather 
than at the px-inclpal market outlet.. !beet'fect ot thla 
tl"Pe of locat1onal patternls to createareaa where much more 
1. The term "delivered pr1c1ns" wl11be us.d interchangeabl,. 
with "baaing pointprlcingtf , throughout th1. paper. Aetua.lly 
"delivered pricing" 1. a broader term and 1n.clude. toning 
and national unitol'11.1 salea price 80hemes 8.. well as the 
baaing point method. Moat writers on th. baaing po1nta7.t •• , 
however, use the term a8 a 8}'nonym to baaing point pricing. 
2. DUdleyF t Pe gl'Um I- The Re ;relet ion or Indu8trz. ( Chicago, 1949) , 
p. 115. 
3. Ibid., p. 116.· 
ot .tbe products.. prot\uce4tbancan becOft.ume4 !nth. market 
1mmed1at.17aur'l"Oundlng theproduct1on point.; The t..tng 
po' 1nt;met'bod '" allowl the highl,. concentx-a ted, i production center. 
to meet prev8,111ng prices 11') more distant marketare ••• 1 
Th1:rd., the total demand for the product 1s u.Buallycom-" 
paratlvel,. inelastic tX-Oma price '8tandp~1n~. wh1~ethemar­
ket1.s such that the potential demand tor the 1nd1vudual pro .. 
ducer'apltoduct 18 b1,gbl,. elaatlc.' This mean. that in the 
ab •• nce otcontrol. the market ,might very well. be compara-
tively competitive .ere it not tor trelgbtd1tterencea,whlch 
!n lom,a cases may be erfecitve barriers to widespread c()mp •• 
titian. 
Fourth, the 1ndu.tr1es have "comparatively high r1za4 
coata •. S This means that there 11 constant pre.sure on the 
1ndlv1due.l to expand his own output... Alao atud1es inth. 
ste-el induatlT baveshown that variable coat. remain constant 
over a ra1Jher wide range of output.4 'This means that the 
average cost per unltde.elln •• 'Until 8. large output le·vel 
has been reached.. Thus, the indivSdual producer 11 a,lwa,.. 
atrlv1n'! tor enough marketoutleta to allow h:tm to produce 
near capacltr_ The basing point. s7"tem allow. the individual 
producer to expand 8.1ea cn a geographic basis w:lthout up. 
setting th, prlce structure ot the lOCQ.l market. 
F1inal17. use of tbebl48,1n,g point system require. some 
organ1zQ,t1on witbin tb,e indus.tryusing it. This gives ,ri •• 
to t'he lastcharacter1st1c of industries using this pricing 
method, i.e., concentration of power within the industry e1t,her 
through th,emed,1um or dominating firma, traci. associations. or 
price leadex-sh1p. It bas been argued that industries using 
the basing poin,t 87stem are of the type which would ordinarily 
'" ,',' , 1 have an administered price in any case. 
OPERA,TIOW 
Ind1apenaableto the opera,t1on of any delivered pricing 
system, 18 publication of the various base priceaby the pre-
, viously desigtated btu,ing points. In the steel industry, 
th1s was done by the Iron and steel Institute. Equipped with 
this information, the indlv:1dual producer finds it rela.tivel,. 
simple to compute the delivered price to an7 possible destina-
tion. In order to faoilitate computation of delivered prices, 
8. rate book is usually publisbed in conjunction with the baae 
prices. These ra.tes mayor may not coincide with the actual 
freight rates. When railroad frel~t rates change, the old 
rat!e book is usually" used until such time as a ne" one can be 
computed.2 Although the s7stem is extremelY' easy to use, it 1. 
very precis8 1 and 1n at least one case, it has been shown tba.t 
prices submitted by cement produ.cers on a government order 
were preciselY' the same to five dec1malplaces.:5 
.- _d 
1. Fortune, xxxix (1949), p. 211. 
2. laefllup, ~. cit., pp. 20 .. 1. 
3. Ibid •• p.-rr. -
8 
x •• 'pinathe. participants tn line Is 6\ comparativel,. 
a1mplepl'ocedurt.1t one of tbeproducers quotes. p1'1ce 
which 18 not1n. l1new1th the pr1ee.whieh WQU14 r~8ultrrom 
useot the pricing formula. the o1?ber members· can retal1ate: 
b'1makingth1s producerts mIll an involuntary basing PO~¥)t. 
with a ·very low ba.S9 px*1ce. This means that sales in this 
proQ,ucer's area will be made on the basis ot a base price 
which may not eveneover cO$t..The: other members ean d1 •• 
vide the btu.ine"e .in thiaarea in such away Illtosutfer 
only very slightly trom the' 'artificially low price. Atte,r 
a shortp.~10d of thIs, the recalcitrant produ.cer u8ual1,. 
conforms. This practioe 18 known tOMV. been successtully 
used inet l.ea.st on,. 1natance.1 It should, be pointed OU:tl 
however, that resort to a ct,10l'l or this sort 18 very rare 
sin.ce aa a rule members of the .,-at •• contormbeeauae it 
1& to theiradvanta,g8 to doe'c. This simplicit,. in opera-
tion, ot the 'bcts1ng point system should not be conftu,ed with 
the vastl., mo.re complicated result.. The basing point syate. 
bas been called the" ••• most intricately contusing phenomenon 
or modern cap1tallsm.,,2 
MEOfJANIOS 
In order to determine what lome of the posa1ble1mp11. 
cationl of the.bbllt1on of the basing poin,.t .,..'Cam might be, 
It 1s t:trst necessary to de·flneprec1sely what the Iystem is, 
III - • 
1. cr. ?loyd Bond, tfEconomlcand Legal Dnp11oa.tiona of the 
cement Decision.," Pr'oeeedinS8 of the TWenn-thlrd A.nnual 
conference or 'the pacifIe Coast Economic IS8oc!i~!on. • 
{to .. Angelea, 1'948) 
2. Fortun., xxxix (1949), p.211. 
and what some ot itl ef.fects bave been. It II for this pur-
pose that the following discussion 1s includ.ed. 
;The singl.e basing point system was the first to be 'used 
in this country and 1s thea1mplest type of de11veredp:ricing 
scheme. This system exists wherl tbe sellers of apartlcular 
product figure freight charges on their product from one par-
ticular product figure freight charges on. their product from 
one particular mill or city. Thu8,for example, it there are 
eeveral widelY' acatteredmil1s producing identical ot' nea.rly 
identical product. and all the mills chal-ge freight on their 
shipments 8a if all shipments had originated at one certa.1n 
m111among them, this constitutes pricing by the 8in.gle base 
method. The single base method is important only from the 
standpoint o·f historical development. It was the first step 
in the evolution of the modern basing point. syatems.1 
The multiple basin.g point system 1s the type most .1001,. 
used :in recent years.2 This method of delivered pricing is not 
so simple or readily understandable as the single base method. 
It exists where the sellers of 8 particular px-oduct figure 
freight charges on their salcs from a group of previously 
designatedm111s or cities. The multiple-base system differs 
from the single base system only as regards the number ot 
points de81gnatedQs bases or basing points. The rule under 
nlultiple basinG point priein,g is that of the various combina-
tions between base prices and freight coats, the one resulting 
1. Ma cblup" 02,- ill-, pp. 1 '7-20. 
2. Ibid. 
-
10 
in the 10w6at de11veredprlce, 1. selected ,b}r each seller .e 
the applicable O~ governing baa. for his, price quotation. 
(See fig. 1). This usually m~flns that tb,seller will com-
bine the ba.se price and fr-.lghtcos'ta of the nearest basing 
point to thebuyerlncomput1ng his price. This would. be 
the case unless the base price ot the'l'leareat base point was 
high enough to more than a,treat freight chargee from a more 
distant base point. (Set) fig. 2). 
Since all them111ssel1to an,. consuming point as it 
the p~od.uct had been shipped from the bas\1,ng point whose 
base price plu8 fre'1ght made the lowest aa1e price, mill 
net or actual amount rece1v3d by the producer after t'rel.ght 
baa been· considered. will vary according to the proximity 
ot the seller to the buyer in terms or freight. If the seller 
18 in a leas fortunateposltion treight-w1s9 than 1s the 
governing baaing point. he 1s said to beat a. freight disad-
vantage and must resort to freight abso~pt1on to m8.ke his 
sale. (See tig. 3). If,. on the other band, he 18 in a 
comparatively better pOllt1on f'reight-wlseto the buyer than 
1e the governing basing point, he bas what i8 termed. a freight 
advantage and lathe recipient of phantom f'relght, or pa,-ment 
for freight charges which do not exist. (see f1g. 4). Since 
freight is nearly always figured on the basis or rail ship-
ment costa, a seller may be ata freight advs.ntageand reoeive 
phantoM freight if there 1s 80me alternative cheaper method 
(for example wQ,ter transportation) of shipping hiB product to 
t,he b\.1'7er. 
11 
One of the mo,.,t important ouigrowtba ot de11varedpr1c" 
inS 1athe pract1ceot market penetration.. Since all milla 
use theba8ing point which results in the lowest delivered 
price to flOj" particular buyer, it 18 possible for them to 
compete in any market, re.gardless of how far it is from 
their plant. l.'hus. 1n figure 1, even though A is the logical 
supplier of the market X, and can supply this market and. real-
jze a higher mill netl'riee than, can the other planta1nth1a 
diagram. the other p,lenta can and do sell at X at the s'ame 
delivered price as quoted by A eventbough they realize lower 
mill nets on their sales. "!larket penetration, oceu!1'S con-
,sts,nt17 because most of the larger producers (o.fsteel) in 
order to operate at 8. low unit cost compete 1n all of the 
rr.ajor markets for the products the,. make. Consequently. 
while one mill sells for deliver,- at points nearer to other 
mills, it finds that more distant mills a.re making sales 
for delivery interritor1es n.earer to 1t.,,1 These shipments 
have been called "cross hauling.1t It is suggested that tbis 
term be g1vena more definite meaning# and confined to ship-
ments of identical -products which occur at about the same 
time.2 (See t.1g .• 5). 
Ordinarily, the natural market territory of any producer 
1s thoueht ot as the territory in which this particular seller 
can make sales at a lower price than can any other seller or 
the same product.. It is read11r apparent t~..at this could not 
1. T .1t .E. c. J\~ono grapb 42, PI'. 3-4·6. 
2, }:b1d. 
be the cas. under a 8ystem of delivered pricing, When eve1'7 
seller queto. the same price to oveX'J' bUJ"fJl' as 18 quoted b7 
every other seller, regardless ot dlst,QllCS f:rom tbe buyer, 
the oldeoncept. of the natural market territory is no longer 
valid. Thus, the natural mB.l"ket territory ot a seller 111 a 
basing po:1nt system 1sdetinedaa that a.rea in which the mill 
can use a delivered price calculated 011. the basis of its own 
base price plus the aetual freight to the POlllt of consump. 
tion. (see .fig. 6). Tho' mill has a competitive advantaee 
in selling 1b its own natural :market territory, but it must 
absorb trelghtin. order to roo.ke sales 1n the natural market 
torritory of any athol" bassm!ll. ThIs means that when the 
mill salls 1n some othor m111ts nat'Ural llm.r1!otterl"'itory it 
mustrece1ve a smaller mill net return t'han tt.w.t D:lQde on 
snles in its own territory"_ (see fig. 7). 
The existence of Ii non-bas,e mill does not alter the 
:' ••• • ..... 41 
na turn 1 tr'~rket area underth& bas lrji! po in t system $ incein 
no case are prices ever computed on 'bhe basis of a non-base 
. 
••• v.... J ....... 
.. '.    
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,-.. . ... -
- .. 
. 
.. 
mill. (Soe fig. 6). If '. however, the non-base mill becomes .: ••• 
.... --
.. -. .. 
-. .. 
. . 
~ ~. ) 
a. basing point, .tho natural market structure is altered dra8A'.~· 
ticall,.. (SGe rig. 8).. In this case" the newba.se mill ha.s 
ltsown market ares. and tho old basing POUlts must nOVi com-
pute pr1ces to consumers ir~ this area on the basls of the 
new poitlt fa base prlce and freight costs. 
The above discussion of the n16chan.icB of' the basing 
. 
••• e • 
. . 
. .., 
po:t.nt 17.tem and the accompanying diagramepreaen'b only a 
ver,. brief and incomplete picture. In the op1n1on o~ the 
writer, theae illustrations do, however, contain tho 8ssent1ala 
of the Bystom. 
A discusalon ot "extra." haa been de11be·rate1l omitted 
trom tn.ducue.ion 1n order to 81mplUy 1t. "Extras" are 
amount. added to, or deducted troll. the base pr1Qe. announced 
for produ.ct OlaS8.fUI 1n order to take care of the part1cular 
bU1er'a8pecifications of size, speoial qua,lltr. special treat-
ment, or Quant1ty.l Prices quoted for de11.ver:y at given d •• ti-
nat1ona, whlch include "extra.". are called net delivered 
price... Omlaa1onof "extras" from the above discussion in no 
way 1nval:1datea the discus.ion. 
.. d < I TV 
1. T.:N.E.C. N.onograph. 42. p. 40. 
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Note: The following eight diagrams were either taken directly 
from, or inspired by, those appearing in T.N.E.C. Monograph 
No. 42, pp. 33-40. 
THE BASING POINT METHOD 
Figure 1: Determination of the governing base under a multiple 
base system. 
The basing point at A is governing for sales to the consumer 
at X. The other basing points would have to compute prices 
on this base. _ ~ 
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THE BASING POINT METHOD 
Figure 2: Illustration of case where nearest base to consuming 
point is not the governing base. 
Both A and B are governing bases to consumer X. 
Only A, however, governs to consumer Y, even though A 
is further from Y than is B. This is because of the 
higher base price at B. 
FIGURE 2 
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THE BASING POINT METHOD 
Figure 3: Illustration of freight disadvantage and freight 
absorption. 
Mills at B and C are at a freight disadvantage to consumer 
at X as compared with mill at A. To make sales at I, they 
must absorb freight. 
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THE BASING POINT METHOD 
Figure 4: Illustration of freight advantage or phantom freight. 
Mill at A has lowest base price plus freight to x. 
Mill at c charges the same delivered price. Having a 
freight advantage of $1 over A, c realizes a mill net 
$1 higher than A. This $1 is phantom freight. Note 
that mill c is a non-base mill. 
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THE BASING POINT METHOD 
Figure 5: Illustration of cross-hauli..ng. 
Products shipped from A to Y go past products shipped 
from B to X. This involves cross-hauling only if: 
1. The products shipped are identical. 
2. Shipments occur substantlally at the same time. 
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THE BASING POINT ~lETHOD 
Figure 6: Illustration of natural market territory under the basing 
point system. 
Mills at basing points A and B realize full base prices 
on sales in their respective natural market territories 
as described by the boundary 0-0. Non-basing point mill 
at c has no base price and meets the delivered prices of 
A and B when it sells in thebr respective natural market 
territories. _ .~~dc. onf~.I.~?. 
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THE BASING POINT METHOD 
Figure 7: Illustration of how shi.pping beyond boundary of natural 
market territo~ reduces mill net. 
When mill B sells to X, its mill net is $ho. 
When mill B sells to Y, its mill net is only ~37. 
1. Freight is $2 higher. 
2. Delivered price is $.l lower. 
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THE BASING POINT METHOD 
Figure 8: Illustration of the effect of naming a new basing point. 
After C becomes a basing point, the boundary 0-0 that lies 
between A and B ceases to be significant. Mill at C then 
has a natural market territory bounded by N-N and Nf_Nt, 
:tn which it establishes lower delivered prices than A or 
B. To sell :tn this terri tory, mills at bas:i.ng points A 
and B must now ~bsorb freight. 0 N' 
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the baling po1nt .,..t .... ,. be, attaoked 11'1 the court. 
und .• r the Sherman Act, ~h.·O~7ton Act,or the Federa.l Trade 
Commi •• 1on Act. suS,. baa.)l"Jlbrough' under all thX' •• of the •• 
18...81100 ••• ·1\11 proseclttion,. however, baa r •• ulted C)n1.7 under 
tile Clayton and Federal Tr .. ti:eCOll8l1as1on Acta. 
Thetollowing 1s a ll.tb':Ot the pos.ible legal pl'ovl$iol'la 
underwhlchtht government could ask the courts to condemn the 
baaU1spotnt878tem a8 uaedcollect1ve1l by an industry_ As 
atated above, 8ucc ••• ,fulpro •• cutionba. resulted O·n17 in ease, 
based upon thoBe portions of the Cla7ton Act. and the Federal 
Trade comm,t88ion Act, wblch.re llsted be·low. 
1. If tn. system ar1s8. a8 a result of agr •• ment. whose exiat-
ence mal' be proved d1rectlyor interred from their etteets. 
(Sherman Act, Sec. 1) 
s. It the .,.stem 18 maintained b1 oompeting sellers who are 
aware that concerted act10nb oontemplated and invited. 
(Sherman Aot, Sec. 1) 
I,. It the 8'Tatemenable. • larger 1rm to impose lta price 
policy on the smaller th-ma 1n t'he induatr7and Ie thu8 a par' 
of an attempt to monopollze. (Sherman Act, Sec. 2) 
4. It the .,...tem 18 the result of agreement. designed to avoid 
price competition. (Federal Trade Commission Act. Sec. 5) 
5. It the system 18 main.t·a1ned by competing seller. tollow.1ng 
a commoneour8. ot aotion which results in a l1mitation of price 
competition. (Federal Trade COmmission Act, Sec. 5) 
6. It it cone'tltutes conscious parallel action resultin.g in 
a 1 1lnlt.at10.n of prlcecompet1t1on. (Federal Trad,G commis8ion 
Act, S.~. 5) 
'1. If members of the system are guilty of charging different 
prices to different bU7ers,not just.1.f1ed on the basis of cost. 
Thleeonstltutes a lessening of competition, and price discri-
mination. (Clayton Act, Sec. 2, $8 S.mended by the Robin·son-
Patman Act) 
8. If' the charging of difterent prices to different buyers 1s 
no.t ju.stif1ed on the bas1sof eost and imposes upon small com-
petitorssubstantial reductions in income, jeopardizing the 
eont1nuanceof effective competition by these sellers ana. con-
stituting price discr1mination. (Clayton Aet. Sec. 2, as amend-
ad) 
9. If charging different prices to different buyers not just 1-
tied on the basis of cost causes substantial differences in the 
profit ms.rgin ot the buyers of the produot which may effectively 
reduce competition. (Clayton Act. Sec. 2. as amended) 
10. If the syatemCllnnot be just1fied as e. method ot meeting 
lower pr1ceso.f a competitor in good faith, because systematic 
dlscr1minat1on which eliminates or reducescompet1t1on cannot 
at the aame t1mebe a meeting of competItion in good faith. 
(Clayton Act.. Sec. 2, as amended) 1 
It has ta.ken a total of 25 court cases and decisions to 
reach the conclusion finally a.rrivedat in the Cement case. 
1. 1.JIachlup,02_cit •• PP.· 42.a. 
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The adjudication began tn. 1910t and. has extended ttJ;)date. 
The crueial lSSU88 1n d,.aiding the qu.estion of the legal1t,. 
of the basing point system were (1) wbether the system was 
based on oollusive orconcerteCl action 1n restra1r.tt of com-
petition and (a).hather it involved. price discrimination 
1nJurlous to compot1t10n.1 
There follows a br1ef history of 81gn1fl.cant court de-
cisions as the1 have developed through the yea.X's • These cases 
have been divided into industries because this method or pre-
senting themeeems most logical. 
STEEL 
The first large scale us. ot delivered pricing was the 
P.1ttsbu.rgh-plu8 system which was u8edin the steel 1ndustr7 
from about 1909 until 1921. In 1921, the ChIcago producers. 
8ufter1ngtrom unused capacity. broke awa,-from the Pittsburgh 
base and began quoting their Bales on a Chicago base. This 
same year. the Federal Trade COmmission, after receiving man,. 
oomplaints from the western steel consumers. began an1nves-
tlgat10n which ultimated in a complaint a.ga1nst the United 
states Steel corporation. 
In duly) 1924. tbe Federal Trade Commission issued an 
order to the Corporation and lt88ubsidiaz-1es to oease and 
desist from the Pittsburgh-plus pra.ctice. The order spec1f-
icall,..tated that prices were to be based on the cost at 
the ml11plua freight (actual) to the point ot destination • 
• jl -. 
8S 
(ThIs would be true t.o.b.m.l11 prioing.) The efrect otthe 
oN:er •• 8 not the abandonme:ttt of the basing point 81'It"DI, 
but s.btp1r the changing of the _1ltem b7 inC?reas:lng the num-
ber of basins po1ntatrom .s!ngleto a multiple ba.se plan. 
This bad the effect 01 brin.gb1gsharp reductions 1nprlc •• 
weat of Chicago and the We'. tern consumers .. ere •• tist!ed 
tor the time. The Federal Trade commission'. order applied 
onl,. to the United stat •• steel Corpora.t1onand ita subsid-
iaries" 80 a large portion ot the steel industry remained 
under the old lJ'atem. In spite of the tact that the order 
was openly violated,l no further attempts were made to en-
force it. EVen the announcement of new bas1ng points pro-
ceeded only verra1owly. For several 7 •• 1:'S, the only effect 
of the orde.r was an increa.ehl the number or mills desig-
nated as basing po1nt8.! 
W1th" theooming ot the great depree.lon in the 19Sa l a, 
tbere developed Bomeopen p:rlce compet1t1on in the sale 
price of steel. This outbreak ot price compet it 10n was 
stopped through the use of governmental power delegated to 
the large steel producers on the tbeoryotlndustr1al selt-
government under the National Indu8tr1al Recovery Act of 
1933. !'he regulations ot the N.R .• A. Code ot Fair Gompeti-
tion restored the rule of the bas1nS point sy.tam. and 
probab17 made it more absolute than :it had been before. 
1. »a .. ChlU:P,01i, q1.t •• p. 67. 
2. Ib14., P ••. ~ '. 
-
S6 
All the rule ... blch hat! been .eer.,t a.nd voluntar7 now beClllle 
publlcandco.p111Bor,.. The baaing point 8,.8t'em was enforced 
'b7 .. ana of prohibitive fines. When the _.I.A •• as declared 
un,constitutional in 1935. antlthe pe,r1odot .elf government 
, ,o,t industry was ended, thepr1e1ng practice in the steel in .. 
duatr7 continued undisturbed. T'he appa.ratu,s of price control. 
no longor legalized, bad to go underground. There is evidence 
that the rulesotthe N.R.A, code not only continued in effect, 
but were amslldedand supplemented a.fterits dissolution. 1 
In March, 1938, an •. mendment to the Fedel'al Trade Com .. 
mission Act.prov,1ded that every order of the. Commission 
should. become :final, and its violat1on. punishable, unless 
a petItion tor revlew "'8,8,- filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. 
This new prov1sion of the la.forced thetrn1tedStatos steel 
corporation to f11e • Pet1tlontor Review in MaY', 1938,a8k1ng 
the COurt to .et aside the 1924 order ot the Federal Trade com-
m'usion.Helther the commia e lOll nor tbe corporation .ere.nx .. 
10us to preas the ease., however. and l1ttle action wae taken. 
A.t this time, the Commission bad begun its cas. agamat the 
aement Institute, and it seemed likely thatth1a case would 
provide the basis tor aettlem.nt of the Steel caae.2 
The war agaSn postponed. action, and in 1946, 'the United 
states steel corporation tiled a "Petition for a Clar1flca.tlon 
1. Machlup, .2R.. cIt., p. a9 IC.ft. Daughert,. •. M.G. d.eChazeau, 
and 8.8. Hrai'ron,TheEconomiesof the. Steel1!l!it1strl, 
a vol. (New York. 19S'1), p. to9S. 
2. Us. chlup. .22.. c1~., p. 71. 
ot 1#13.. Ord: •• under Review." The eorpo:ration .sked the Ooto.-' 
to mod1t7 the order ottbe "'ederal :Trade COmmuI1on in auch 
• fl • ., aa tool1m1nate the prohibition a_lrl.t freight abaorp-
tlon., The answer to this ctlIne1n the form ot the Cement 'Deci-
sion hAnded down1n 1948. Il\. 1947, the comm1as1on issued a 
Compla1ntaga1natthe American h-on and Steel Inatltut. and 
101 firms in the steel 1nduatr,.~ The Complaint charged the 
f1rmswlth bav.1ng 1'0110".'. ".~.a common andcooperatlve 
course ot aetion 1n their •• ··.use of baa1ngpo1nt practlce.~tt 
Tbe1ndultry did not give up ita legal battle.ltb the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, end continued to ins1st bef'orethe 
commission a8 well •• before the court, that it. 'baaing 
point ."stem .a. laWfUl. At the same time, how.ver t it die· 
continued using thebas.ingpo1nt .,ltem (Ju17. 1949) and 
started .ell1ng steel on an f.o.b. m111 basis. It explained. 
th1a actlonby po.1nting to the tact that the system bad been 
declared illegal. 
This decision by the Iteel hlduatl'J' to abandon the baains 
po1nt.sy8tem ..... apparentl,. part of a grand strategy tor taking 
the ca •• to oongress to obtain apecisll leg181atlon.1 The method 
chosen served to raise steel price. and thU.8 to create a demand 
for return of thetleheapertt baaing' point s7stem. If the tran-
sition trom the bas·1ng po1nt system to u1l1formf.o.b. mill 
pricing were to be made without increasins the average mill 
net price, this averagem:l.l1nat price would have to become 
aa 
the uniform t .o.b. mill price. Base prices are u,\tall,. set 
at lit hlgbellou~ levelt;Q a.llow for freig)'ltabsorpt1an,. To, 
eet the t,.o. b. mill price. instead., a t the level of the tor-
mer base price was to ralse!)r1cee qu1tedellberately and 
was by no means a necessary consequence of the transition 
to the uniform i.a.b. mill pricing formula.Thi8 prioe in ... 
;creas8, was made pOS8ible by the cOl1lb1nation ot the cost in-
creasea and the excel,S 6.f d.emandover e.x1sting eapaci,t,. 1n 
the earl7 p08t~war era, as well as bye high state of organ!-
=at1on within the industry. Most observers agree that this 
priee increase wa,acontemplated whether the basing points,s-
tem was abandoned or not. It offered an excellent opportunity 
to put the ne. f.o.b. mill pricing 87atem in an unfavorable 
11g:ht at the outset. Combined with the price increase, were 
the ditf1oult·les orad.justing to a new pricing ayetem,.&s 
well al threat,. on the part of steel producers tha.t reloca-
tion of plants to CO.nform with the new pricing system would 
be very costly and. would further raise pr1ces. These and 
a:im11ar items were used bY' the steel j..nduatry to put the 
new syste.m at Q disadvantage w1cth the public from the start. 
The management of steal makes no secret of its desire to re .. 
turn to the old, mope controllable system. It is at present 
doin,geveryth:ing in its power to brin.g about this &00. 1 
, d 
1. Norman FOY,e "The 6ssentialsof the Steel Producers Right 
to Compete ," ne f lvered prieinsand the FUture ot Anle:riean 
BusinesaJ'i The Econom1c InstItute 0/ the'UntEea 'states 
,i~Iam'6er of Co1l1l!!arce,( Wa abington,. 1948) ,pp. 127 .. 135. 
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court action aga inat' the use of bas ing point pr1c1ns U1 
the cement induatr7wasbegun 1n 1923. The District Court 
decided that there was ,unlawful combination in restraint of 
trade 1n the industry. Tllftt cement producers under the lead-
ership oltha cement ABsoc1atlon appealed the esse to the 
Supreme Court. In their case, the cement producers tried to 
prove that uniform delivered prices were a natural result of 
perfect oompetition. In the words of ,the Court: "A great 
volume or testimony W8..S also given. by distinguished 'eoonomists 
in support of the thesis that :\n the case of a standardized 
product sold wholesale to ful17 informed buyers, a.s were the 
dealers in cement, uniformity of price will inevitably result 
trom act1ve, free, and unrestrained compet1t1on.n1 The court 
was peraua,ded by this argument. It wa.s thus that 1n 1925 the 
multiple ba.s1ng point system in the cement industry was, in 
effect, .sanctioned b,.. the supreme court .. 
There seems to be but little doubt that price competition 
was absent in the cement industry since the baf!Je prices rama.in-
ed unchanged fro.m January, 1933, to June, 19:38. Also, the in-
dus try was brought together by mergers so tha thy 1937 the 
five largest firms in the industry controlled over 39 per cent 
or the tota leap. e1 tr-
1. Cement Manufacturer's 'Protective Association v. United 
States, t!liau.s. 588, !05, 606 (1915). AlSO 1'01' a sImilar 
sta£ement made by the representatives otthe steel il'ldustr7 
see: T.N.E.C. Monograph 42, p. 52. 
In 1937, the Fed.ral Trade COmmi.sion i8sued Ii COmplaint 
againat the cement Institute, and 74 cement companies. The 
proceed1ngs 1n this ease included testhnGllY as to the facta 
as wella8 the economic issues involved, and a large number 
of academic economists were called as exp'ert witnesses. 
Finall., in Jul,. " 1943, the Commisaion issued a Cea8e-and-
Desist Order. The Oement Institute s,nd the compan1ea appealed 
to the courts. The first decision was banded down by the 
CireultCOurtof Appeals in 1946. 1 This decision set aside 
the order by the Federal TradeCommls81on and in effect aane .. , 
tloned the use of multiple basing point pricing. TheFederal 
Trade COllllnisaion appealed this decision to the Supreme court 
of tbe Un1ted5tates, whicb 1n 1948 set a.ide the decision of 
the lower,couztt and upbeld thecommi88 ion • s order by a 6ta 1 
1ilajor1ty.2 
The Federa,lTrade COmmission's order was upbeld by the 
supreme Court on two count.. The first W&.8 that the basing 
point system, as used by the cement industry, was unfair com-
petition .in v1olation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
The second was that the indultr1'suse of tbe system conatl. 
tuted systematic price d1scr1mina.t1on injurious to competition 
in violation ot the clayton Act .a amended by ,theR.ob1nso.n-
patman Act;.- The court rejected th.e contention that price 
d18cr1m1nat1on inherent in .s7stema.t1c treie}ltabeorption 18 
1. Aetna portland Cement Companl v. Federal Trade Commis.ion, 
324 U. s.. 7ae (lOIS J • · r 
2. Federal Trade Oommiss1on v. Tho cement Instltute) 353 U.S. 683 t nliS)tB s.:cl;p.70S. ... .. . .... I 
lawful 'UI apr1ce reduction, -made in good faith to meet 
an equally low price of acompet1tor.,,1 Tb1s provUlon of 
the Robinaon-Patman Act beara, Qceordin.g to the court. onl:r 
on tf ••• 1nd1v1d:ualcompetltlve situations, rather tha.n upon 
a general system of competition. ttl 
As was the.CItse 1n the steel industry, the cement· indus-
try used the. t~an81tlon from basine point to t.o.b. mill pric-
ing as an excuse tor raising prIces. This was possible :1n ce· 
ment" as in steel. because. at the 8ltisttn.g prices, demand had 
been1n excelsot the existing capacity of the 1nduatry. At 
pre.sent, the cement industry is a lao making eyery effort to 
return to basing point pricing.3 
CORB PRODtT eTa 
The corn products or corn. derivatives industry- 1s concern-
ad. with the production of such things a.a oorn syruP. glucose, 
corn sugars, dextrin., starches, and corno11s.Corn syrup 
is the chief sweetening ingredient in. nearly all sorts ot 
candy and is also w1<1817 used in. j8111e.1 and jams. Col'npro-
ducts are a180 foun·d 1nbaby'a formula, cannedfrult,bread, 
book b1nd:lngs, eoap, and numerous other a.rt1eles found in 
eve17da" use in almost an,. household. 
The corn product,indu8try was quite competitive !nthe 
beginning, but it eventually became consolidated into the 
1. Language of Section 2b of the Robinson-patman Act. If' this 
can be proved. prosecution 1s not possible. 
2. From the majority opinion in the cement case sited above. 
3. Machlup,02- !!.t-; p •. S3. 
1 -handa of a few produ.oer.8 tbr,OU(.:h a system of m,ergera ..The 
mergers were deelaredto be tlle galln part, Bothe in.d'Q.str1 
resorted to trade associations to condu.ct its 91'1oe poliey •. 
The f1:rst scheme used. was a single basing point system with 
all prlces1ssu~d on n Chicago, 'base, This was abandoned atter 
at1me, and atntllt1ple basing point systemoomb1ned with zone 
pricjngwaa adopted. a 
The Federal TradeO!l~leslon issued a Cesee-an<l-Des!st 
or(ier to two of the firms in the industry in 19:59, 1939. The 
prod\lcersap:?ealed to the courts for relief from these orders, 
and jrl April, 1945. the Supreme CO~lrt handed down two dec1. 
sians. The f1rstof these decisions WQS handed down in.hat 
is called the Com Products Case. In this cQse,the t>lants 
of the company were located in Y~nsas city and. prices were 
ba.sed on de11ve.ry from Chica.go. Chlef consumers o.t the pro-
ducts of this company lU3:re candy 'producers. The ef·rect of 
the companyfs price policy was tog1ve 8 competitive advan-
tage to the producers located at Chicago as against those 
located closer to the· plantae The Supreme Court found that 
the differences in price eould n.ot be Juet1fiedby differences 
in cost such as would ha'Je made them lawful undex- the Clayton 
1. Ibid., p. 94. By 1906 the Corn Products Refining COmpan7 
conirolled 100% of the production of glucose •. The National 
starch Vanutacturing Company oontrolled 80~ of the starch 
production 1n the United sta tee. 
2. tpid., p. 86. Packaged goods were sold bY' zones end bulk 
goods were sold on 4l. basins point arrangement. 
33-
Aot as amended. The Supreme Court u.pheld the order otthe 
1 Commiaalon. 
The .econd ot the •• 48c1l10n. wa. hand.td down 1n wbat 
18 called the St.l.7ca •.•• ,8TbeSt.187 plant was lo,cated Sn 
l)tcatur, Illinois and it too· based. it .• prioes on a delivered-
from-Chicago b •• lI. T'hedtaor1m1nat1on and1njury arls1ng 
fro. this prioing practico.a. much the .ame .a that 1n the 
corn Products Clu,e. stale,.,· bowever i offered the deien .•• 
that .1ta price policy was directed at meeting the prioes set 
by corn Products. The court said. that " ••• the COmmissionts 
conclu.lon a"ems inescapable that respond.ent'. disc!'1m1na-
tiona, such as those between purcbaser81n Chicago and 
Decatu~, were o8ta.bl1ahed not to meet equal17 low Obicago 
price. ot competitors there. but 1n order to establish 81 ••• 
"here the art1ticial17 hlghpr1c •• whos. d1acrltnlna.to17 etrect 
permeatel r •• pondenta entire pricing sY8tem." A8 a re.ult of 
tb. above named decisiona, tour trade as.8oe1atlon8 whieh bad 
pertormed servlce. helptul in ensuring observance of the 
baaingpolnt rule .... ere dissolved 1n september ot 1946. 
The l'eaeral Trad.e commi •• lon found it naolu.8arTin June, 
1947, to proceed with a new complaint aga1n<lt 19ttrms com-
prising about 95 per cent of the1ndultl"7_ Among the tirma 
are the two who lost their cases before the $u·preme Oourt in 
•. J 
1. cornprQduc.tfJRet1ninsqo:nentv. Fedel'all'z-a.de Comm18,a1on, 
SUi T.l'. S • '1D! (!giS) • 
2. Federal Tra.de . Comm1s81on.v.,. &.E •.. stalel Hanutaetu.rms 22m. 
~anl' 32'1 13'.3. 146 {niS). 
3.orwin D'. Ed ... rds, "The Efrect of the Recent Basing point 
Decisions upon Buaine •• practioe.,-The American Economio 
Review. xxxviii (1948), p. 830. I 
the above de Ci8lon. .'fheoommlls1oneharge. that tbe indue-
t1'7 18 .tlll .t1aing price.' on a Chicago 'ba.. as •• 11 ..1ndulg-
1ngin othercollu8ive practice.. This complaint 18 still :In 
the courts at thet1:me ot th1a writing, bUt it the comml •• 1on 
1. upheld, the corn PrOducts and Stale,. cases w111 beyiewed 
a8 apee1al ca8es :In an. induatr,--.wide collusive plan.l 
STEEtCO}lDUIT 
The Federal '!'rad. Commission 1asued a Cea •• -and ... nes181'; 
order both. Rlgid Steel Conduit Aa,aociat1onln connection 
with their priem.g practice. In this caStl. the Commission 
tound not onl,. that the produoerll had conspired to adhere' to 
a priemg plan, but a1ao that eacb individual producer had 
adopted the ba.1ngpo1nt .,..tem1ntbe lmowledgetbat the 
others .. ere doing 11kewise. Th1a aotion oonstitute. illegal 
el1:m1natlon 1n vlolatlon of the Federal Trade ·00:mm1881oo Act.· 
The ASloCiation appealed tbis order to tnecour'b.. The Circuit 
courtot Appeals upbeld the Commisalon's order and the Associa-
tion appea.led thctcase totheSUpl'flme court. In APril, 19,9, 
the supl'em. court b7 fl " to 4 de 018 ion uphe 1d tbe d.ecl. ion ot 
the lower court.3 This case "as viewed as beingeapec1a.117 
11gn1tl.cant since 1t wal. 1n .trect, a test ot strength tor 
the cement Dec1.,lon. 
b .. 
1. Ibld.. p. 831. 
2. lD'lCY •• p. 835. 
3. 'lYiOFsel. Feldman, "Baaing pointaand the 0 '.ahoner B111," 
Fortupew,f· x.l( 1949 1 ,PP. 14:'7-8. 
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In .al1 the above ••• a, the Court and the Oommission 
have baaed •. 11 their dee1a lon. upon the existene,e ofa con-
spiraar to f:J.x prices,somettme.accompanied. bJt a oonapirac7 
to restrict competition Sn other way.. The Commiaalon'. Pl'O-
c •• dings bavenot been directed against the baa1ng point ays. 
temper •• , but apinatconapiracJ' or collusion resulting hl 
price d1acr1m1natlQnwhlc.h, 1n 1,~8 turn, 11 a departure trait 
price competition. Thll hal created avast amount of speen-
latlonon the part of aca.demic economists, government employ-
ees, and bueines.men .a to the exact legalatatue of the 
basing point practice. 
In tho hope ot clar1fJ"1ng the isau, aomewhat, the 
Temporal?' National Economic Committee made the following state .. 
ment in 1941. 
"EXtensive hear1ngs on baaing point systems aholf 
that the., are u~.d 1n many mdustries as an etteo-
t1vedevlc'o tor el1m1nat1ngprlce competItion ••• 
The el1mlnat10tl of suoh systems under ex.1st1ng 
law would involve a costly process of prosecuting 
aeparatell and individually _ny industries,; and 
place a heavy burden upon antitrust enforcement 
appropriation ••• Wetheretore reoommend that the 
Consresa enact legislation declaring 8ucb pricing 
818tema to be illegal." 
Conge •• took no 8.ctlon on the T.~J.E.,C. recommendation at the 
time because the war had begun 1n Europe and Congress was 
bU8,. witb detense preparations • 
• " n 
Atter thec •• ant ».01,lon in .Aprl1, 1948, clar1tlcatrlon 
of the 18_1 atatul of b.aing po.1nt prlcing .,-atamlae,.ea to 
become apresaSngneed.specula,tlon .a to· the 1mpllcat1ons 
ot th1a decislon hal app •• rea on al1e1del, andha8 been 
extremel,. varied. Juetice Black ot the 8upremeOourtmade 
... tat.ment impl.,1ng tbatthe cement Deoision would make 
baalrls point pricing illegal 1n nearlJ' all eastus, Mr,Lo1rel1 
Mason or the F.T.C. echoed this sent1ment wbenhe said. "I 
believe that a.n individual del1ver$d price .ystem i.out, I 
believe that freight absorption 18 out. I believe zone price. 
are out.-1 On the other side of the, argument 1s the statement 
of Mr. Robert Freel', Oha1rm.a.n ot the Federal Trade Commie81onl 
"Now 1n the light of that· ana17lia, I would just 
like to otter two conclusions tor you. The first 
18 that basingpo1nt and dellvered price 178tema, 
as Su.ch, are under no sp.c1al atta>ck. In prooeed-
ing aga1:nst collusive price tixing. and injuriouS 
dlacr1m1nat1oll. the Oommuslon has attacked those 
d.llvered prioe 878tems where they appeared to be 
the core of price fixing conspiracies or destructive 
ot competlt1on.Secon(\. it hal been too broadly 
a:8.erted that all delivered price·. 'are unlawful .. 
No Commlsa1onorder haa yet required f .o.b. mill 
pricing, nor torb1d«1en treight absorption, except 
in a context ot price fixing or destruction. of 
competition. and since, of course. theComm18slon 
has entered DB sucb order,. the courts have sus-
tained none .. • 
It ••• ms 11ke17, that theop1nlona. of Juatl!ce Black and 
Mr. Itason are rather extreme pointe ot view. .1". FreerI'. 
atat.ment 18 • much more rational and probable atat.m.nt of 
the "resent legal atatua. Certain.l1,the act10n of . the 
1'.'1'.0. llae been more 1n,..ep!ngwlth thia atat: ... nt. 
Ai pr •• ent, the F.T.C. holds that It 1:8 n.~.18.rr to 
look hl.to the c1rcumetanQa, .. ot a .particular induetry ".to •• 
de.cU11ng whether there 18. ca.uai tor le .. l action. Legal 
action will be brought Ol'll."itl 
1. The delivered p;rlo1ilg .,..ate.is part ot a con .. 
'P1J.a07 'toeliminat,eprloe competition.! 
B.There 18 unlawful p:rlce d.1acr1m1natlon. 1.e •• 
bu,.era are ohargeddUterent prlce. where the 
d1fterence 1a not tull,. Justified -b7 dUterancea 
incoat,. such pr,ie. discrimination 18 unlawful 
onl,. !tit injures compet1t,lon $JDong bu,.era. 01' 
8ubatant1ally l •••• n. competition among the 
t,1rmt. 1mmed1ata competltors.2 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTIO! 
In an attempt to clarity the i •• u., Senator RemerE. 
capebart (ft) of Indiana aubmltted a re8olution au"hartlins 
the senate Committe. on Interstate and Foreign OODml8rce to 
conduct an Snqu1r71nto the 1mpactotthe court a.cUlon. 
on .business. The Oommittee ftl tomakeltB stud., and pre-
sent recommendations to Oongress tor appropr1at,. aotion. 
A.the re.ult of this Committee" aet1vlt7 a bill .. 8 intro-
duced 1n Oonsre.1 1nthe summer of 19'9 whlch.ould bave 
I.· U • I I J • 
1.S& 0 if, lot the Sherman Act. 
2. sec. a or the Clayton. Act .a amended. 
declared a.mora.tor1uIn on F.T.o,aetlvlty 1n connection with 
basing point pricing tor one year. Thi's bill was: defeated, 
however, Qnda bill introduced by Sena.tor O'Mahoney (D) of 
\t7om1ng was proposed 1n ita stead. 
The 0 'Mahoney bill declares the basing Points1stem to 
be legal only when u.sed by a single aellerand. without other 
price dlecrlminatton. This means that under the F.T.C. and 
Robinson-Patman Acts, del.1vered pricing a.nd freight absorp-
tion w11l llot be 111egal when used by a single I'rodueer. 
The carrol and. Kefauver amendments to the 0 'Mahoney bill, 
if adopted, would make it il1~gal to absorb freight costa 
in If good faith" where the action would violate the Clayton 
Act .a amended. Theaeamendments have the etrect of killing 
the "good faith" arguments r'o!' delivered prices. This bill, 
as amended.. passed both Houses of COngre.ss and was. aent to 
the Conference· Committee. In this Committee, the amendments 
wereetr1pped from the bill tl.nd the wording of the bill cbanged 
in su.ch a way that the u·goodf.a1th" argument could be used. 1n 
support of B. delivered pricing system. Also, the wording was 
changeCl in eucha way tha.t the burden of proof that a price 
fixing conspiracy existed would fall to th.e F.T.O.' The net 
effect ot this, o.t course .. would have been to we.ken the 
F.T.C'.,chancea tor successful pros-.,·cutlon ot 1nduatriea 
u.ing the basing point 87,Btem. The bill aareported from 
the Conterence committee palsed the House, but a bltter 
.argument develop'ed in theS.na~e and consideration ot the 
bill was post,poned 'until the next session of con~ess.l 
Thus, a,t the time of th1,s writing. there 18 110 new legiala-
t10n clarity,ing the legality of the baaing point system. 
r ... 
1. "TbeBasing Point Bill, tt!e~ RfltUbl1C,,. Oct. 31, 1949, 
pp. 8 .. 9. "Delivered Prlc,ii1g sf;I 1 l'UZ~7, "BUsiness Week, 
Oct. 22, 1949, pp. 20-21. See these two ar:t&!cle8 lor a 
moreeomplete d 1s cu8110n of the 0 'Mahoney bill, its amend,. 
ments, and the changes made by the Conference COmmittee. 
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIO,NS OF THE AJ30LITI0!1 OF THE BASING POD'if 
SYSTEM OF PRICDl G ONTBEUTABSTEEL INDUSTRY AND ON 
THE EGONOJvr! OF THIS REGION 
THE GEDVA STEEL PLANT 
All the steel produQed. :in the state of Utah at. the 
pres.e,nt time is produced at the Geneva Plant. This Pla.nt 
not only produces for the immed1ately surrounding terr1tol'7, 
but for eerta1nsegments ot the market throuFPout the west. 
Its size and. the divers tty .of its market. outlets make it a 
particularly good model fora. stud,. of the type proposed 1n 
this paper. 
Tbe Geneva Plant wa.built at the request oltha orrice 
or Production Mana.gement by the united states steel Corporation 
witbout fee. The original cost of construction totha govern-
ment was $191,000,000. The steel products to be made by this 
mill were plates and structural shapes for theneeda ot the 
Pa cit lc Coas t sh.ipyards. 
Since it takes approximately five tons orra .. mater1al 
to produce one ton Q.fsteel. it 1s apparent that the steel 
producing point must be located w1th an eye to proximity to 
raw materials rather than to markets. In selecting a site, 
within the state of Utah, consideration had to be given to a 
location possessing adequate transportation facilities ands1tu-
ated at m1n.1mum d.1atanc88 from BOUl"CeS ot iron ore:lcoal, lime-
stone and dolom1te, it ... as necessary also to select a place 
where sufficient freeh wa.ter W8S available. These cons1deratlons, 
along w1th tbl governsant'. w18b tod.centrallze the new .ar 
"r 
plant •. , 1'!.8ult\ed in the ae,l.etlon ot the Geneva Plant .it. 
1 
on t·h.shore of Utah Lake nea.r the city of Provo. 
Tht Geneva .Plant 18 very favorablJ' located w1tb reter-
ence to the transportation costs Oll raw materials. Its coal 
18 shipped a dletallc. of 120 miles, its iron ore comes from 
Southern Utah open pit mlnea and moves 8.. total ot2S5 mil •• 
and its flux ( 1 imes tan. and dolomite) moves 35 mllea. In the 
words of walter JlathesiUs,pz,fJs!dentot the QenevaSteel 
COmpany: 
"Material assemb17 costs fo,r aeneva are favorable. 
We can produce excellent steel for the Western 
marketa. cheaply as anyone and more-cheaply 
than most. Geneva 18 a fine steel plant. wl 
As regards transportat1onfac111tles, Geneva 11el at 
the junction of the railroad l1nes over which raw materials 
are assembled, at the apex of the railroad linea that tan 
out to the thre'eprine1pal Pacific coast markets and those 
running to the North, .:at, and Southeast. Also ita labor 
supply can be drawn trom the largest eonnnunlt1ea in th.e rosion. 
The plant has three blast furnaces with a dail,. capa.city 
of 1100tona each, making a comb1ned annual total of 1,150,000 
net tone of pig iron. There arenlne open hearth furnaces 
each with an annual capacity of 1,280,000 net tons or steel 
ingots. The plate mill baa a capacitY' of 700 .. 000 net tons 
1. "The New Industrial west", (pamphlet published by the 
United states steelCo.rpol'at1on, 1946), p. 143. 
2. Arthur W .. Baum, "Utah'. Big BabY'," saturdaz Even1ns Post, 
May- 15, 1948, P. 6S. 
of t1n1shed p,lates per 78.,ll' .. and the atru'ctural mill, 200,,000 
tone of varioue tJP •• and a ue. ot atru.otural .t.el. In De-
cember of 1946, facilities •• re completed tor the production 
of hot rolled coila. This w111 not cnange'the a,bove mentioned 
plant capacities excepttha,t much or the steel which formerly 
lert Geneva as plant and etru.otures w11l now leave blrolled 
coil form. 1 
At the close of world War II, the emergency need tor 
Geneva's vast plate and structural steel capaclty no longer 
existed. ThuD, the plantwa8 listed. tor sale under the pro-
v1s1ona of the surplus Property Act. The united state. steel 
COrporation almoat 1mmed1ately Bubmitted a bid. Opposition 
to the sale of Geneva to th18corporatlon developed in certain 
governmen.tal quarters, on the grounds that it would make for 
monopolistic control otsteel capacity in the western United 
.states. For this ~e.son and others, the United state. Steel 
Corporation withdrew 1ts otter. Tb18 action by the corporation 
resulted 1n an immediate movement 1n Utah to have the Geneva 
Plant owned and operated by U.S. steel. In view of this strong 
op1n10,n 1n the west and requests ot g()vernment otficials that 
the corporation reconalderlta ,decision, United state. Steel 
submitted a bid to PUl"cha •• the plant and inventories at 
Geneva tor $47,500,000 and pledged that in the event or accept. 
ance of its b1d, not les8 than $18.600,OOOad,dlt1onalot ita 
1. Geneva steel Company Press Heleasedated December, 29, 1948. 
own fund. would. be spent 1n the p •. ac·.tlmereconveralon o,t 
the (]en'iva Plant·. Tbi. bid ••• accepted,and peacetime opera-
tion. otaentva steel ••• ,subsidiary of 'the United states 
steelCol"p'o'ratlon began on JU.ne 19. 1946.1 
'.mE COM,PARATIVE POSITION OF THE GENEVA PlANT. 
It will be helpful. before any.ign1f1cant eo'n,cluslonB 
are drawn concerning the.fleet of the new pricing pol1c7 on 
the Geneva Plant, to take • brief look at the competItIve 
position ot Geneva .1th' reference to the other Westernstea! 
producers as well as the po.sible competitors from the East. 
Betore any analysis can be mad. concerning the .treat of the 
new prioing policy on the Geneva Plant, it is nec8ssar7 to 
.aeerta.1n juat how the Geneva Pla.nt compares with other plants 
throughout the United states and espee1all'11n the Western 
United state., a8 regards pro.xSmlt7 to rawmater1als, types 
of steel products needed and. produced, and production fa.o!l-
ttl.s. 
we.tern steel capacity 18 largely concentrated in the pro-
duction or bare, 11ghtetructural ateel, rail and othertraclil-
age supplies, flat rolled or plate and tbinnel' than plate 
guage steel, and wire and wir. products.2 (See tig. 9) ot 
th~use various produ eta ,Geneva prOdu eel light structural 
to'rntl. plats_ and thinner than plate rolled steel. Figure 9 
reveal. that in 1944 the Qeneva Plantwaa the leading western 
[ .;J 1,1 
1. "The New Industrial west," pp. a .. s. 
a.Mahone,., J.R., "The western Steel Induatr7 with Special 
Refer'ence to the poat"ax-Operation of the Geneva Steel 
Plant," Utab Economic and Business Revlew, Vol. ;'-'. 
Salt Lax. Cit,., 1944-45. Part I, pp. 37-9. 
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producer ot light ,Itruc.tural and pla.te.teel. 'Ph.recent 
addition otfac111ties. tor J'o1.1ing plate steel to hot rolled 
col1s of th.inner than plate guage. has changed this plct.ure 
somewbat aothat no. the. Geneva Plant 1s producing. signl-
tlcl;nt-amount otrolled steel ooilaand smaller amounts ot 
plate and struotural 8teel than f'ormerl,..l western capacit,. 
in theprOduct1on of light structuralateel seems to be 
more 1;han ad .• quat. to nl.$st the demand. The demandfor·struc-
turalshap •• at Gen.8va bas dropped. otf to th..xtent that it 
.asnecea.ary to 010'. the mill in June, 1949. The etru.c-
tural mill was reapenedra%' limited produ.ct.1on in December 
or the same :rear" but, the demand for Btructural shape. con. 
tinu •• re1atlve17 weak, and the :future ot tbi8 mill at the 
present time 18 uneertain.2 
The combined western capacity tor the production of 
steel plate, and strip of thblner than plate guageB, prior 
t,Q con.struet,ion of the aen.va and FontanA Plants was estimated 
to be enough toeupp17 only- about 10 per cent of the normal 
western demand. 3 Th1. should asaure the Geneva plant· a strong 
and ratherateady market tor it. plate and hot rolled steel 
products. The moat recent f1gure. 1ndlcate that this ie, 1n 
tact. the case. The plate mill and, the bot rolled col1 
1. Letter trom paul Sul11van j D1rector otPubl1c Relationa 
tor the .. ".". st.el company, to the writer under the 
date of January 17, 1950. (HereafterreterX'ed to a. 
Sulllvan Letter.) 
2. lbidc , ' 
3. lalione), S'!.- .e.~ ... Part I. 1'.3'1. 
taol11tle.Ylere llaedat lOOpel'Ce¥ltcapaclt7 until. the 
mtddleof 1.'9, and bay, been aperated attrom '10 to 80 
per eentotcapaclt781nee that t1me .• 1 
lh •• certa1n1ng tht comparative poaitlonottheaene'Va 
Plantas regard. the coat. of' material.itt 1. nee.Baar,. to 
mention the location of thavarlo\18 materials, the comparative 
costa ot the mater1ala .mclud1ng transportation coats, and the 
amounts of the material •• vailable for exploitation. 
The Geneva Plantproduceasteel tz-om pig iron. us1ng onl,. 
the m1n1mum amount ot scrap at •• l necessary to 1naure efficient 
operations. Iron ore a.nd coking eoa1 are ot approx1tnatel,. 
.q'\l81 1mpo~tance .a basic raw materials for the product.lon of 
piS tron"S Evidence ot the favorable cond1frlons under which 
iron ore hal been mined 1n Southern Utah, 1s provided b,. the 
tact that production was approx1matel., 6 •. 4 ton. per man-hour 
in the period Irom. 1937 to 1941. These ealculat10na are baeed 
on allot the emplOlllont requ1redtor m1nin.g the ore·, deliver-
ing it to the crusher and loading it on the railroad car8, 
Production in the open pit mbesoll. the Me.8ab1 range 1n 
Minnesota 1. approx1ma.telr 3 tone per man.-bour, intb.8 und.er" 
ground mine. otAlabama it 18 about • '7 ton.. Add to this. 
tbe tact that the ore. mined 1n tbe Me.abl range must move 
by 1".11 a dietance ot 77 mile. to load.:tn.g docks, be unloaded 
trom ,thers 1lroadcara and reloaded on ahips. Then it moves 
876 mlles over the Great Lakes, 1s loaded 8sa111 onto railroad 
• r· d 
1. Sullivan t.etter_ 
2. .hone,. ,02- e~t. , Papt I. p~ '1. 
ca ... , and then move. an ave1'flge dhtanHot 183 mil.. to the 
plttabuJ'sb a:rea.1 Gene ..... ~on ore ItOve,1 15~ ra~l mil •• on17.S 
!he .xtent ot theoredepo8,ltnow be~g used b1 the 
Qen ... Plant, 11 ,not def1nitely known. This d:epo81t, ot cours., 
will be e:xhau»hed at lome future date. JU8't wher_the plant 
will than turn to secure 1t801'e is not certain, line. com-
plete kllowledge ot the extant, quality. location, and m1n1na 
costs or all the possible sources of iron ore in th.1s are. 
has not yet come to l'1ght. In an,. event, it 18 probable that; 
the great bulk of the 1ronan.d steel industry of the United 
states will have to turn to higher coet iron ore considerably 
lo,oner than the periOd when this w111 be required of the 
:; Geneva plant. 
Probably the most important competitor o,t W •• ternsteel 
produoera,partlcular171n the pacif1c CO.at markete, 1s the 
Sparrow. point Plant of tbe Bethlehem Steelcompan1. A com-
pariaon of the coat. or producing steel at this plant and at 
the Geneva plant is extremely difficult since the coatI at 
Sparrows Po1nt are not obtainabl.. This plan't 1mpol'ta 1.ta 
!ron ore from the El Totom1n4l. 1n Chile. The •• mine. are 
located only fUteen miles 1nland from the port oteruz Grandt. 
The ore 18 loaded bere on company owned.hip.tor the tl'lp, 
4471 11:1181. to Baltimore. The ships return empty. In the past. 
the- price otthe ChUean orehaa been ver'7 loY, but by the 
oj •• . fl 'l " rr:r. 
1. Ibid., p. 16. 
2. ISm. 
3. ISg ••. pa.rt I, p. 16. 
4' 
time the ahippmICO.t." 1ruslQdlng the canal toll", bave 
been.tlded., the, price of tb1a 'ore ba .• been about the aame 
•• the, ore used by P1tt8burgbplanta.1 
The above ,tacts 88 •• ,tO lnd1cat. tbat tbeeoat of pro-
duction of p1g u.on 1n Utah, 1s probably 108e than tor the' 
plant8aroundQh1cage. pittsburgh, andothor centers depend.-
ent on take Superior or8e, allo, that in all probabilIty, 
the cost at sparrolis Potnt.Kar1land, 18 somewhat 1n exc ••• 
of the C08 tat; Qeneva. 
It 18 more difficult to make a eomparlsonbetween the 
coate of producmSpigiron at Geneva and at the w.est Ooast 
productionpo1nta.Aa1de from the ateel plant at pueblo, 
where the typical relationshlp betw.en piS iron a.nd 8crap 
has prevailed. western steelmanutaeturins ha. been based 
primarily on scrap. That ,is, scrap steel 18 used in much 
larger quantities 1n proportion top1g iron than i8 usual 
in steel product1on.2 Most of the piS iron used by plants 
on the we8tCOaatcomes trom the, blast furnaces at Ironton, 
Utab, and a.ome com .•• d.irectl,. from Geneva.3 Th1e moans that 
the pig iron used 1n the Pac1f1c· Coast plan.te must travel an 
average distance ot from 700 to 800 miles b,. rail. There are 
blast turna.cea tor the production of piS iron at the Kaiser 
steel Company'. Fontana Plant near Loa Angeles, but tho 
capacity 1aonl1 432,000 net tons annually_ In addition to 
1. Ibid". p. 18. I. X51~ •• p. 1'-
z. sullivan Letter. 
this, all cok1nscoal for the operation of this blasttuJmace 
comes from the utah coal tleUs, which means that it must 
travel about 800 mUe.by ra1l .. 1 
As regard. coal suitabia tor coking and blast furnace 
use .. Geneva 18, aga.1n, tavol'*ably situated. The total reserve. 
of all the coa.lot the eleven western States amount. to approxi-
mately one. half' the total reserves of the united states. or 
this enormous reserve. 4Sper cent 18 located in tho cont1nuoue 
andamoat unbroken Tr1-state t1eld, 1n Southwestern Wyoming, 
WGB,tel'nCOlorado, and Southeastern Utah. There 18 very little 
coal woet of Western W70mmg and central utah.2 
Moat of the known western reserves of coking coal are 
lo'eated in Utah. Colorado, and Ne.Mexico. There may be 80 •• 
important deposits in Washington, Wy'oming, and Montana, but 
to date, these fields have notbee.n explored.3 This meane that 
of All t'h~ waa.te:m producers of steel,Geneva and Pueblo are 
the only two plant.$ which are located within eas7 distance or 
cok1ngcoal deposita. (Se. fiS. 10.) 
AS for the relat1ve cost. ot scrap, thezae 18 no reason 
to think that any large price d1tterentiale.x1Ita between 
Geneva and the oth.r western producers. Nearl,. all the scrap 
used by the We a tern plants comes from the •• stern states. 
Boat at the supply of steel a crap comes from the operation 
1. ;.r.n. Mahoney, 02- c1t., P$.rt II, p. 9. 
2. Ibid., Part I. p. ~ ~. xom. ,. 
-----
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0.£ th •• 'eelturnaces an4:: polling lIill.~ 80 1t 18 n~t un-· 
likely that the Beneva p:1ant 18 large1,. B.lt~luppor1t1ng in 
thls mat.r1al~ 
Most otthe 1mportantt'ei"roalloya are round 1n',81zeable 
blount. 1:1'1 the W •• tern united stateh '!'he Clttnew p~nt1a 
8S f'avorabl,. located with rs,terence to theBe as are1al'l,.other 
prOducers in tbeUn1ted. states.,l 
One important raw mater1a,l whiCh is otten over~ooked 
but which 1s extrem,ely vital to the operation of a steel 
plant 1n Utah, is water~ The l1m1ted supply 1n utah makes 
Itnecessary tor those who are operating the steel plant to 
become qu1te e.tt1cimt in, the proper and. full utl11~a.t1on ot 
the water which may be avallable for uae.2Xl11tant conse~va.. 
tlon. bow.,rer, should make the supply adequate. 
Not the leaat of the considera.tions on selectibg the site 
for the Geneva Plant was the availability ot labo:r. I The 
Geneva steel Company emploY!' 5500 men, one halt otthem at 
: 
the steel plant. The problelll with reterence to labir was 
not so much one of getting men as getting trained industrial 
workers. This problems.ems to bavabeen solved to I the satis-
taction of all. Moat o.f the employ.es were small t.rmers be. 
tore they began wo.rk1ng1n tbeGeneva M1l1, but tbelracta indi-
Oate that they have adjusted ve:ry rapidly and have become as 
- . I 
efricient a8 JnOst steel l1ox-kerIJ 1nother j mOl'8 highly indus. 
trialized, areas.3 Tl'l.$ Geneva Plant compares tavora'tily with 
t r 
1. Ibid., pp. 19 .... 27. . .. . _.. .... I 
2. WiI1f;.er Matbea1us, "Balf lfdlter1al Problems of the ll'lter--moun-
ta1n and. West coast Areas," Pape!' pre$entad at the seventh 
Regional TeebnlcalMeetlng otthe American Ironalna Steel 
Institute. (san Francisco, 1948), P. 1,0. 
3. Arthur W. Baum. loc,. cit •• P. 66 • 
......- .......... 
• 
other plant8 in the tTnltt\dstat •• a$ regards the q~11t1 
I 
and quantlt:rot 1t8 labor supply. I 
'The only othereonsidttrat1on neeel.8ary to pohlt out the 
r~lat1ve posit1on of the Qeneva Plant 1n thewesteT steel 
lllfllt'ket 113 the comparative El,dequacY' of its plant an~ equipment. 
The large amouJ'lt ot area ava1lable for the constru1t1on ot tb1a 
In:tll has enabled the optimum location Of the variou,s devices 
necessar,. to the pt-oduct1ve process. Conveyor belt
l
_ move the 
various raw materials to the aaaemb17 points. All :the1ngre-
d ients ne cesBaryforthe production of p 19 1ronaremoved 
d~ectly from the stockpile,s to the blast furnaoes by a con .. 
veyor system. 
I 
The plant 1s arranged to allow for some divers;ity in the 
final produots. 'l'he Plantla equipped with a alabbi1ngand 
bloom1ng~lJ..l wl1.ich maY' prod,uceo1ther blooms :for tbe struc-
tural mill or slabs for the plate mill. Slabs may be either 
used :bmllsdately or stored for conditioning and scarfing to 
elhui..YJ.a.te defects. The Ganeva platem111 is orricifallY 
classified as a semicontlnuous 111111.T!lis mill is ~qUiPPad 
with all the latest mach1nery and patterned after tiEl most 
lleeent cont1nuou.s plate mills that have been constrlUcted m 
the tna:1n steel centers of the country. 1 
In Deoember" 1948,inatallat1on oi~ the, neoessary facil-
ities for the production of hot rolled c011 were cO~i1pl&ted. 
With tbe installat10n of the new equipment" 1n¢l.ud~g It slab 
iff. 
, 
.que.mer, avel't1cal edger, two giant t1n1ah:1nS. stand. and 
I 
the'co11era, the finishing speed of the combined p~t. and 
coil mill has been !nerea.sed to a maximum ot 2,200 i teet per 
minute, approx:1ma te 11 double the former speed .1 It i 1s undou.bt-
I 
edl,. t·bi. addition to the capacity of the pla.te and col1 mills 
that has allowed the plant to operate at from 70 t180 per 
cent of capacitY' in spite of the shutdown of the structural 
mill. 
This plant and equipment compare very favorably with 
the other western steel producing facilities. Sinqe the 
western 'producers are .• w1thtbe exception of the colorado 
FUel and Iron Compan,.'s Plant at Pueblo, Colorado, Ibaaed on 
i 
the use otserap, theY' can 'never do more than supply a small 
part of the total steel needs ot the west, coata ~t Geneva 
! 
are enough lower than those ot the F'acUie ,coast states pro-
ducers that there should be no ~ea.t difficulty forth. a.neva 
Plant to compete in the sale ot steel on the west Coast. This 
contention 111 borne out by the fact that at prellentj' tbe Geneva 
Plant 18 finding their principal marke,t outlet ,on the west 
COast in spiteo! the transportation costs 1nvolve~. 
EFl"ECT OF THE NEW PRICI~lG P'OLICY ON THE UTAH STEEL 
IIIDUSTRY 
The steel in,dustry. including the Geneva steelJcompany. 
abandoned the basing pointayatem of computing del~Vered 
pr1ce. in JU17, 1948. At this tim., the deman.d tori steel 
1,. Press :aelease from the Department ofPub11c Relalt1ons. 
Geneva steel companJ, dated Decembe.r 29, 1948. 
wasmexee.$ of the Stl·Pp11,. and nearly everrm!11 lnthe 
I Un1tedStates was'produelng at capaeltJ"~ SlnC8 the l-l'ket 
I 
ft,.· not wba.t paatezpe1'1enoewould ind1catoas the 'Usual 
th1ng1n the steel 1nduatl"1. an,. factual or statlsttcal stud,. 
I 
of the ebange.s oocasioned by the' 118W pricing systemi uniform 
I 
i 
f.o.b. mill pr1cing,must he postponed until such tte as 
the market situation approximates what it hal been . pre-
vious years, Also, the Geneva Plant had beeri operaled as 
i 
a privata concern only since June. 1946. This is hardly 
enough time to 0;.110w 4 cOmparison of the conditions, before 
and. aftel' the changed pricing polioy to be made. It is for 
these rea.son. that the study is made on the basis 01 economi0 
analyais rather tl:l&n facts and figures, 
UTILIZATION OF CAPACITY I 
The ,stael industry 1s crJ11raeterized by very niSb, fu.ed 
costs relat 1vo to variable costs;. Tl11s has lead to an esti-
mate that the average steel mill must produoe at from 30 to 
SOper cant of capacity to eo:ver the overhead or fued COS"tl.1 
This mean., in effect. that costs and profits in thJina.ust17 
are very sensitive to changes in the rate of cal'aci.ty utili-
! 
zatlon; average unit costs vary1ng inverse1:r. and profits 
directly, with the volume of output. The effe·ct of, uniform 
f.o.b. mill pricing, as an alternative to basing pointpricinS' 
on the utilization of: capacity is. therefore, or fundamental 
1mportance in determining whetber tbe (}eneVaPlant lill be :1n 
fA stronger or weaker pO$1tion as a result of the ch~.ru:;e. 
I -
! . 
1. 'W8,lter Adams, The strpcture of American Industrz, (New York, 
195'0), P. 166. 
The &me. capac1tU8. aft 80 al'r&nged that .~ ohtm8tJ 
in the proportion •. ot tSnal product:. produced 18 po,.lb1a., 
i 
That 18, it '18 pOl81bleto converta,ome ,ot the ingots into 
.' I ' 
I 
either plate or thirmer t'ban plate polled stael, 01' !1nto 11gb' 
! 
structural form., depending on therelativeetrength of tbe 
I dema.ndtor these types ot products. In the past. tbe west 
I 
haa been .lurplulJ 8.1'-e. in the productionotetrue91l'81 shap •• , 
and a deficit at-e. 1nt'be production of !llates a.nd strIp. 
I 
current production figurea of' the Geneva Plant seem: to1ndl .. 
, . 1 . I 
eate that this is still the Of-Ule. If 80, the Geneva, Plant 
! 
is 1n a surplus 8.1'8& w1thref.'erenee to one item or produ.ction, 
and in a def'1e1t9;rea with ret·erenee to another. The eftectl 
I 
I 
on the capacities for the two types ot products mlg'ttt be 
quite different. I 
In the ease of 11e:ht atruetursl roms, the ex-1stence ot 
! 
a basing po1nt fJyst.·em mle!ht have made it p08sible t~ utIlize 
I 
enOUgh capacity to maintain prOduction of' this prod.t.et. By 
I 
absorb1n.g t~81ght, the son.v.Plant could have made i salea 
I 
outside theWeaternmarket. Thus, in etfect. the a.tneva plant 
I 
I 
cO'Jld have dumped 80me ot its product in another nlant •• h1arket 
... I 
area. In all probability. this would have been don~ only it 
it were 1mposslble to change the amounts of the types of final 
product. So longa.s the distant sale ,covered all var1a.ble 
I 
costs and an,. part of the fued eoste, the otf1·c1e.ls at the 
GenevQ Plant would have been ju.stif1ed 1nmaking it from the 
• u --a 
1.. sul11vlin Letter. 
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atamlpoUlt ot profit,. The effect (>n the steel .1ndustry ae 
a whole would have 'been 80Jnewbat different. however. Sinee 
the product would have been dumped in another compet~l'e terr1-
tort. tho saving1n eost of 1dleeapac.lty Beerusing to the 
aenevaPlant would I'lltve been of.foet by the loos to ~he cOlllpan7 
in whose area the (1ump1nswa.s done.1 At bast; the a.ggr.,gato 
etfe·atonthe steel industry would have been ne1thercost 
. SQving nor cost in.creas ing. 
In the absence of the basing po1nt system, thej proponents 
of de11vere.d p:ricing argue, theetfect 1n an area of a~rplu8 
steel production will be cutthroat oompetition. Tiloy say, 
that a1nes it will pal the producers 1n the 8urplu. area or 
product to make any sales that will cover :all var1aple costs 
and. some part !of the fixed. costs, every producer in this 
s1tuat1onwill ultimately lOVier his price' to below the point 
where total coats are co·verad. The end result would .•. of 
course, be thesurv1val of onlY,the strongeat.2 It ~Ot"s not 
seem likoly that this will be the outcome at the aeheva 
Plarlt·. In tho first place, thitl plant can switch to the pro .. 
duct10n of the more readily saleable plates and atr·1p with-
out necessitatmg a drastic cutbaol;: :In total output. If the 
price were lowered under un1form t.o. b. m111 prloin'g to the 
extent that salos could b. made 111 a more distant market 
territory. that would mean that the prices to local buyera 
I 
.4. t .A Y"_ .... 
1. Frarik. A. Petter, "Exit BasinS Point Pricing," Tbe American 
Economic Revl!-:, xxxvl11 (194B). p. B2S. I 
S. Atlama ~ ~ •.. cf~... p,. 16'1. 
•• 1'. l111e.l.el0 •• red.,1. Unl.e.8.1 th. gamsby 8.1lmg .1J'l the 
mOl'.diatant marlee' 'terrl,o%'7 .ere more than enoughtio 
otf'a.,tthe loa.e.engendered,1n .ell1ng at •• lower pl'ice 
in the.ore 1mmed1ate' .,rket territor)", the .al ••• ouldnct 
be made. A1IIO" the ownerlSof Geneva dono·t bave inve.tment 
tied up in the structural mill to the ex.tent that would u8ually 
be 'the.... It must bebo:rn. in mind that this mill".a pur. 
chased at about one fourth the cost of conatruct10n.,The tact 
that the structural mill was closed 1n m14-1949 ,without .. 
p1"ice war being preolp1ta.ted seema to bear out this oontention •. S 
Eight,. per cent ot the market for structural steel pre-
duoed at the Geneva Plant 18 on the Pacific Coast which leave. 
on1'y 20 per cent 80ldin the inland western region. :s Thus, 
it would a ••• that the po •• 1bl11ty or other' plants penet1"at1ns 
Geneva" prinoipal market,. the west Coast, under the basing 
pointsyst.em, was fully as great as the possibility of Geneva. 
su.ccessfully penetrating other market areas e, In the light ot 
this, it seems sate to ecn~~~d~ that the net effect o·fthe 
abandonmen.t of basing point pricing on the structural mill. 
w1l1 be negligible.. There seems to be no logical justifica-
tion for the belief that it would have functioned any differ-
ently under basing point prlelng than at present. 
The .situation with reference to plate and hot rolled. 
strip seemssom.wbat different. western demand tor these 
1. Fa.ilure to do this would baa violation of Sec. 2 of the 
, Clayton Act as amended., S8.supra, p. 22. 
2.·,sulllvan Letter •. 
3. Ibid. 
products haa been, •• 'nd continue. to be, rather 8trong.1 
The major po,rt1onot the .teel which leave. the Geneva 
plant 18 probably in the form of hot rolled, coila. The •• ' 
are shipped to the (!oldreduotlon mill at the Un.ited stat •• 
Steel Corporation's Pltrbabuttgh Plant located near San 
Francisco, C81Uorn1a.2 Thls movement of plate and bot rolle,d 
c011s to the Pacific coast statea accounts for 92 per cent 
01' the output ot these produ,cts at the Geneva Plant. Onl,. 
8 percent of Geneva te output ot these items 18 conlumedln 
the Mountain States.3 
What the effect of the abolition of the baaing point 
system w111 be upon the ut111iation ot the plate and strip 
capacitY' depend., upon whether the Geneva Steel CompanY' can 
compete with the producer's of theee products on the west 
coast 1n the matter of price. Also. the produ:Jers of the •• 
produ.cts on the Eastern seaboard must be considered as possible 
competitors. At the present time. the fisure. would1nd1cate 
that Geneva 18 competing successfully w1thboth these groupa. 
This m8.7DOt be a truep1oture, however, since the present 
time is one of very larse demand.. Whether the Geneva Plant 
will be able to compete in the future if there 1s a large 
reduction in demand. remains to be seen. The facta 1nd1,ea..te 
tha.t on the basis or costa of productlon,the plant at Geneva 
should be in a strong competitive position.' The COlts ot 
1. Ibid., Mahone,-, oR- cit., Part I, p. 48 
2. Ginevasteel COmpanr-rr-e.IJ Releaee, under dat. ot December 
29, 1948. 
l-. e~:,:111v&n Letter •. 
4. See section on the comparative position of the Geneva Plant, 
supra, pp. 40-51. 
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tl'8napol'tation. however. are tul17 a;s1mportant as the com-
parative cost. of produetion.. At present theaeare suob that 
the t .o.b. mill price of plate mill products plus transporta-
tion costs to the west Coast result1n Ii price Which oempares 
ta"orably with final pri,cea from other plants.1What the 
freigbtratesYl111be in the future is, of course. 1mpo8s1ble 
to •• y. If there is no significa.nt change, however, it seems 
. likel,. that the Geneva Plant w11l cont1nue to supply 8. large 
part ot the Pac1tic coast '8 needs 1n plate and strip ateel. 
To determine what the .ftects or the new pricing polic,-
will be, it w111 be helpful tot1rst see what would bave 
occurred under the baaing point system. Since Geneva was a 
2 basing point for its own products, tbe'lJe 1a no reason wh7, 
under tbe bas,ing point system, sales 1n th18areasbould not 
have taken plaeefrom Eastern are.son 8 freight absorption 
basis. It 1s doubtful tbatth1s would have occurred .a ,.et, 
since local demand is probably strong el1.ough to absorb Eastern 
output of steel produets 1n most cases. \¥hen demand tall. 
below the level where steel producers can find local outlets 
for near capacity product lon, the Pac1tlc COast, and even 
the Mountain states, would be subject to market penetration 
from Eastern produoers under the basing point .ystem. pric •• 
from the Eaaternmilla would, of course, have been computed 
on a Geneva-plue baai. whlch would hav.involved some freight 
1. Thi8 tact 1s indlca.ted by the ability ot the Geneva P'lant 
tOB.II most ot their present output on the Pacific Coast. 
'2. -The New Industrial west," p. 18. 
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ablorpt1on 1n nearl1 &.1108 ••• , Th1a would bav. been SUltt-
tled lx-oll th •• tandpo1nt· or profit, bowever, .0 long a. the 
mill net return to tbe mill practicing the freight a.baorptlon 
... enough to cover all variable coat. and any partot the 
thed COlts. 
Market penetration from t.be Ealt can occur under t.o.b. 
mill pricing only 1t the mill price at the Eastern plant 18 
auch that attertranaportation hall been added,the price on 
the We.teoaat 1s as low as the prevailing price 1n tbls _r-
ket. It may betbat the Sparro .... Point Plant of the Bethlehem 
steel CompanyatBalt1more,M'4r)"lanc1. can share1n the "f)stern 
market on this basls. Eastern producers located inland trom 
the Eastern Seaboard are almoat.urel,. el1m1nated as competitors 
in th-e we.tern market under f' .o.b. mill pricing_ To lower 
their mill pric.e toa level low enough toott •• t th.e dUter-
ence in transportation coat. between the two are •• would be 
disaat'roul a1ncethi8 would mean that this lower p;rlcepre. 
vailed 1n their l0C8.1 market as 1'811.1 
The adoption ot £.O.b. mill pricing alsures the 1mma. 
d1ate118urroundlng territor" aamarket for Geneva produoed 
steel only. Thus. the 20 per cent of structural steel and 
the e per cent ot plate mill products which Geneva sella to 
the local are .• are almost certainly going to be supplied by 
the Geneva Steel COmpan,. in an,. event. For even a ~N.8t coast 
pl'odueel' to penetra te this market under r .0. b. mi1.l p2'1clng 
would be extremelJ' unlikel,.. To doth1. the west coast 
1. Sec. Sot the Cla7ten Act a8 amended. 
, sa 
produce%' would have to low ... hi. mill prl,eto all burel's b,. 
an .mount But'tlcientto ott •• ,t the transportation :from the 
Cosstto the Intermountain area * 
In the 11€llt or theabOV.ana11s1., itseeme like17tbat 
the 81*£8ctof the adopt1o~ ot uniform t.o.b. mill p;r;l.c1ng on 
the ut 11izat ion ot the Pl.tilt .... and· strip capac.1t1eawl11be 
favorable ,oZ' ,a t leal t ,:llot unfavorable. 
POSs IBLE EFFE01' ON .LO:atrrIoN OF FUTURE CAPA CITY 
The ettect of the abandomuent or basin! po1ntp~1c1n8 
on thepo881ble future locatlonal pattern of steel production· 
, 
in utabu conditioned by •• veral cona1d.e:rat1ol1speeul1ar to 
this area. The Geneva Plant, which was buil.t to satlsty .ar-
tfme demand tor certain products, hal suob large capacities 
in comparison to what itsee.8 western demand will be_ that 
1taeelt1a unl.11celY' tba t an,. new capacity ..,111 be added tor 
80me time to come. Itl and when. the demand in the Western 
area increaaes to tbepoln.t where ne ... capao.ltle.8 art justUied, 
the new pric1ng po11~7 11r11l und.oubtedly play an 1mportantrol. 
in the locat1ona,l pa.ttern., however. 
BecauS8 or the large amount of ... eight differential :In 
the :raw mat'er1ala and the t1n1shedsteel., tbepl'imar:r 10ea-
tional tactor under an,. pr1c1nglystem 18 proximity to, and 
ava.1lab,111t1 of, raw mater1ala..In8otar •• this 18 the govern-
ing consideration. utah. is favorable asa future site tor ateel 
production. An7 ducue.ion ot future location must have this 
111 the background. Aa to the effect ot the prlcingsyatem on 
future location. hlatorrha. ahown that the allow.nce ot 
new baaing points hal re8Ul'ed 1nthe 'movement &wa7 hom 
the old produe1ngoenter. to new ones 8.nd the general dee'. 
entra11zat1on of the 1nduatr7.1 If' this 18 the result (fJ.t' merelr 
.etabl18hing newbaa1ng PQ1nte, it seem,s l1ke17 that the re-
sult ot abol1ahing the 8yatem would have an even more pro .. 
found eftect in the a.me '. ,d!i'ect ion. 
Because of the lack 01' an,. raw materials on thePl.cltlc 
Coaat. it aeems likely tbat any future plante which are bullt 
in that area. or an., ex.panl1on of exlstmg plants on the Co •• t, 
w111 bav.to 'be on tbe basls of scrap iron and at.alae prin-
oipal ingredients of the steel production. In the years 
prior to World War II, tho supply ot .crap totbe coastal 
producers was mo.re than a.mple to meet their needs. With the 
shipment ot large amounts to J'~pan and other Far Eastern 
countries juatbetore the War, however, th1scc>ndit1ott changed, 
and scrap was in shoX'·taupply. Although these exports eeased 
a sbort time prior to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, and al-
though current scrap .uppl1.,. increased 8ubltant1all,.durins 
the war Years ae a result ot west coaat ahipbuilding and other 
war-time manufacturing activities, the ea8Y aupplf situation 
of the pre-War Tears baa never returned, and 1008117 ava1lable 
scrap luppll •• have since then. been hardly 8utt1c1en:b to meet 
the needs or the gr'eatlr enla.rged capacity which now exist. 
on the Weat Coast.2 It' west coast production continues to 
1. Fritz Machlup, The BasinS po.1nt. szstem, (Philadelphia, 
1949), p. 237. 
2. Mathesius, lOQ., clt ••... PP. 14-15. 
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grow at thl. great a:p •• d. even it the .teel plants on ten. 
coaat expand proportlona117. it '18 apparent that thepox-t1on 
ot the ateel 1ndu:str7 in the west based on sorap call never 
supply more than a pc?tion of the needed steel;. This means 
tbatsome add1tional eapae1t,w111have to be added 1n the 
areas where iron ore andcok1ng coal are available. Figure 
10 indicates that Utah is more favorably situated. with re-
spect to these materialsthall are •. n,. o.r the other western 
states. Wbetherenougb. raw materials exist in utah tOIUp .. 
port anrgrea.t17 expandedateel output w1ll depend in pa.rt 
on possible new discoveries and technological developments 
which might made now known deposits usable. 
AS regard. theefreet o·r t.o.b. mill prlcingon the 
tu.tul'e loeational pattern, onl,.tbe broadest generalization. 
are possible a.t this time. Iteeemsratber certain that thla 
type o.fprloing will have a decentralizing etrect on future 
location of productive capaclt,... Under 'this 87stem impetus 
1.8 given to locate as near the consuming market as pOlsible. 
It a small' plant can locate at the point of consumption it 
has an-advantage 1n the local area over all other producers. 
Th1sadva.ntage d1d not exist unde.l' tne basing point system. 
where an70ne canidaell 1n that market on a freight abeorp .. 
tlonbas1a. Wbetberthe savings of large scale production 
'are enough to offset this looat.1onaladva.nta.ge remains to 
be seen. Palstoost studies, 1r.t the steel 1nduatry indicate 
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1 ithatthi. 1. pro'babll not tb.s ca.e. 
An addltlonaltuture .ttect of the change 1n pr1cSns 
is that unde.the new syate. encouragement 18 given to inde-
pendent producer. to begtn small .cale operat,1ona. Under 
tbe bas1ng·point system. tbe independent was at tho·merc,. 
of the larger producer since the small produ'cer's market 
was alw8.1S open to invasion. This 18 pa.rtlcular17 s1gnU ... 
1cant in the Western areawl1ere the united states steel 
'Corporation at present contro'ls 51 per cent of the output 
'of steel ingo'ta.2 Whether or not the advantage given to 
the lmall ind .• pendent producer is great enough to overcome 
the tremendous advantage ofs1ze of the gia'nt concerns re .. 
rna ins to be seen. 
POSSIBIL!TY OF FORCED RELOCA'l'IO!J OF EXISTING CAPACITY 
Probably the greatest amountot controversy wh1chhas 
come out of the decisions forcing abandonment of the basing 
point slstem in the steel and cemEfnt1ndustr1es.. eenterain 
tho idea that the adoption of t.o.b. mill px-icing will force 
It. vast amount ·of relocat1onof ex1sting production fac111tl •• It 
It is argued tha.t these industries have grown up under the 
basing point system and located in· such Q wayaa to profit 
most from this pricing method.. Now that the system bas 
been abandoned,. these plants are no longer atoptimuln loca-
tions and. will be forced, in many oases,. toelo!uJ down or 
.. wr I c 
1. Th$Ba81ng point Problem, T.N.E.C. Monograph 42. (Wa.shington •. 19:tl),p. -al •. II J I ' .... u ,
2. Ad.mB.o2.~1t., p. 160. 
move '0 • more tavorablt loeatton.' 
Itap,evs that tbeJ'e m:1ght be.o •• justificatlon tor 
the •• bell.t.. The baaing point syate •• nQou~ag.d the •• lec-
tion ot loca,tlon'l on the ba.au of a8semb11coata rather than 
on the baa1so,t pro;x,imit1'to market Qutleta.1 This can be 
eas111' seen in the ca •• otthe P1tta,burgband netroltar •••• 
Detroit haa onlJ t)per cent of the steel capacity 1n the 
United states and con.um •• If5 per cent of all the .'8.11>1'0-
duced 1n thiscountr7t On tbe other hand, Pittsburgh and 
the immediately surroundlng area produees 40 per cent of' 
t,he nation'. steel while this same area consumee only-20 
per cent ot thenat10nal output. Tb,18 meane that one balf 
of all the steel produced in the Pitt.burp area mu.t be 
exported to other consuming region'.. The cost dlfferential 
between the.e two area a is not la~ge enough to justify this 
very- great discr.pan'c1 1n eapecltlea.2 
It can also be shown h1atorieall,., that the baaing pamt 
Il"stembaa tended to encourage the expans10n of ex1at1ng capac.· 
1ty and retard, .hitt.in productive facilities. In both the 
steel and oement 1nduatr1e •• tb.re bas b'een a notable reluc--
tance to grant baaing po1ntatatu8 to ne.mills. This dela7-
e41natallat1on of new producing po.ints &1 'basing pOinte, 
with baae price differential. smaller than .freight differentiale 
- I 
1. ){aChlUP.O~.Oit., p. 160, Daugherty. deChaBeau, and. stratton. 
The ,eonOll\ Q$""'01"tbe Iron and steel Induatrz, (New York, I§Sr, pp. S42-i. 
2. Adams .. 21- cit., P. 175. 
57 
from old areas, haakept the; d.ll~'i'.4 p~10. at too high 
• 18.,,81 to permIt sufflo1tntd._mand to, d.e"elop ':In the ne" 
area. 'this has retarded the growth of l'ag1ona,1 produ ot ion 
1 
oapac1t1. 
The .1nten •. lt7 of reeling a.bout the p~181b11:1t'1 of forced-. 
reallocation 18 exemplified b1 tbe fOllowing 8tat,ement made 
by the General Prea1dent 't>tthe Un1ted cement, L1lnGa:nd GypalUll 
Workers International Union betore the Senate Bubcormnltt •• 
on Trade practicest 
"The moving or cloaing of any of thea. large cemerrt 
!)lants, or eve,n l'Qrt of Q, plant, would disrupt the 
oommunity life of these small towne, becauaetheee 
small towns are more often one-industry communities. 
At\t that. it would be impossible for most of the •• 
workers to migrate to new 10 ea t10n.S because of 
family con.d1ttons and otber reas()ns j c and it would 
all result in the creating of small ghost-towns, 
such as we have experienced in cOB.l-minmg 'commu~ 
nlt1es after the supply has been e.xbaueted ••• "2 
That the adoyt1on or r .o.b. mill pricing will aceelel"S.te 
tbe tendency- to regionalizo pr1:ma.rY'l'roduet1on fac111.t1 •• 
can be pla1nl,. aeon. 11onetheless, to expect the adjustment 
to occur overnight 1s to repla.ee reason with hysteria. rartl. 
eularly 1s tbis the ease w1'th reterenee to the westem area • 
. No reallocation of fae111t1esha. bee.n r,oreed 1,."'l any area of 
the u-n1ted states to date beceule or the large demands tor 
both .teel and cement since the bal.ing point system was aban-
doned. !t i.e extremel,. fortuna.te tMt tb.ls ohange over was 
d -'1 ... 
mad.e in a period of above','ave:rase demand. The locatlon.al 
adjustment. whiCh must be ttad,e ,caD now be made mOlle gadual17 
and with les8 111 effect than would have been the case in a. 
period of lower dflmand. If tt,e preae.nt h1ghrate of steel 
consumption continuos, it ,is very possible that adequate 
return onlnvest,ment. made in areas whioh will be surplus 
Under f.o.b. mill pricing, can be aeoured. 1 
The Geneva Plant seems to be in a completely secure 
position as regards posBible reallocation of fac111tle·a. 
It is supplying a deficit eteel' producing area which. because 
ot the nature of raw material location, will in all proba.bl11tl 
continue to be a deficit steel producing area in the future. 
!n add It 1on,. the 'oeneva. Plant was not built w1th an eye to 
the delivered. pr1c1.ngeYBtem, altl1ough.1n all fairness it 
should be said that1t. location proba..blywould. llave been 
the aame 1£ it had been. The Geneva plant was, instead, 
built to m1n:1miJe assembly coata of raw materials, near 
adequate raw ma~erj,a18uppl1&o., fa.?U ~t &. PGlint where it"ould 
be relat1ve17 secure from possible enemy •. ttack in wa.rtime. 
It 8 .• e1111 unlikely- that reallocation of the Genevatacl1-
lt1es would take place in the near future even it it were 
econom1cally-juatlt1ed, which it certainll" .1s not. Firat 
beoau •• the investment of the present owners 18 only a frac-
tion of the construction eost. $800n4, because it would 
, - - * .- , 
1. Adams, O~.2':.t., p. 184. 
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be •• ir ... l,. costly to mo~.' the •• tacl11t1e •• Th ••• eon.l-
deratione are of acad..mle tnt.rest on17 a1n.oe the Geneva 
plant.lll b. favorably located under the n ... pr1eing ay.at ••.• 
since f.o •. b. mlll pri'c1ng .111 provide 1nc~:ltl •• tor 
et •• l eon3,umera to locate in areal of surplus Iteel produc .... 
tlon, and tor new at •• l produt';ing plants to locate 1n d..fIctt 
producing areas, the state o~ utah and the Geneva Plant will 
both benefit undOl'tbe cbanged ."stem. Th1a 18 becau.:ethe 
stat •. itself is asurplu. area illlteel prOduction, whil. 
the area served b7 the Geneva Plant 1s a deficit steel pro. 
dueingarea., It would be a mistake, however, to expect 
\ 
an,. _.8 migration ot fabrication plants to tb1s are. 1.8 a 
result o~ th. Changed pricing 'policy- 'The preponderance of 
demand tor 'a.bricated produot. 1n the W •• t 18 111 tbe ,ac11:'lc 
eo •• t State.. Because of the co,ncentrat1on of demand there, 
and the.mall &mountot demand, b7 comparison, in the inland 
W •• tern regton, it .• eems likely that In the tuture. 88 in the 
PIlat, ta.brlcatore 91111 continue to locate as near tbeir market 
outlets .,S possible, 1 ••• , on the , •• UloSo.at. !h. moat 
obvlous rea.on,of course, 18 because 1n a vast majority ot 
ca ••• ,th. freight rates on the finished produet are 81gn.1t-
ieant17 higher than the rat,elon the steel used asr ... material. 
(For example. l'at •• on she.t steel are much lower than rates 
on finished refrigerator •• " It mlg)1tbe tn.t !nsome particular 
case., the .elght loat in the fabricating proce.1 is enough 
to overcome th1a d.1tteren.ee 1n l'Ittea bet.een steel .e a raw 
material and tbe f1nished tabr1ca.ted produGt. and it th1a 
'0 
w.",tru., the .stat.:llC. or compa1"8.tl.ve.ly low, pr1e •• at the 
Geneva Mll1 would be anhloentlve .tolo'oa,tlng 111 th1a are •• 
Itmu81 be re:cogn1zed t how.vlr, tbat th18 wou1dbe an unuaual 
situatIon" and ,that the freight d1fterent.!a.l would. be one of 
blgher treight ontin1shed products in nearl,. all .... s. 
On. oth.~ pO.8:1ble consideration is., rabl'icat1nS indus-
try 1n the w •• t wbieb .erved a market whlch was notconcen-
trated on the PacUl.e GO •• t. If such an induatrr ext.ted, 
it would be to the advantaSft of the owners to loeat. whel-e 
the coata of procuring tbe raw matertal were least. In the 
We.tern United statea,thl •• ould mean locat1ng near the 
oen ... Pla.nt, By doing tbls, the producel"s 1n this indus-
try could .erve a wider market. geographically. than could 
produce~. located at an,. other point. Sere again, however, 
the situationwQuld be exceptional. and tor the overwhelming. 
tnajor1trot tabr1-oating industr1ea in the western tln.1ted 
states, the market lsconcentrated in the paoific coast 
statal. 
There is one o'tberpo8.1ble outcome 'ot the·changeto 
t.o.b. mill pricing w1th lte:rerence to location ot steel pro-
du.c1ng facilities. Thla possible locational effect ariae. 
from the tact that there •. re many t)'p". otlteel produot_, 
partleularl,. certain 8'teel &11078, whioh are n,ot produced 1n 
the w88t.1 Under theba.a1ng po1nt eyatem,t,b ••• items .ere 
1. Economic In.t ltute. DellveredPrlc1ns and therutureof 
American . Bulin.,a •• u.s. ali.ber of Commerce,. (Wa.!ili'i8~on, 
1948) p. IGI.n. Hr. F.B. Delong, Vice president 1n Chars. 
of sai8a. COlumba steel company, stated at theme.ting ot 
the Industrial plantl'J)cation Committee of the california 
state Chamber of Oommeree, that 35% of the steel eonaume4 
in the west comes from the Eaat. unquestionably, 80me of 
the steel consumed was or type. not produced in 'the West. 
luppl1edto western con.um.... on an Eastern-baa1ng ... po 1nt-
plu.-t~.lgb.tba.·u. tJndel'unitol'Dl t.o.b. mill. pX*,lemg,the,. 
m,.t8t be:sup,pl.1ed on an t·.o.b.-produ.o1ng.po1rlt-plu .. B-.frelgbt 
basil. Any fre1ght abaorption which may hav.occurred on 
the sh1pment of the •• 1tems under the basing po1nta,..tem 18 
not pOI •. 1bl;e under unitorm t.o.b. ml11 prioing. :tnth •• b-
1·.0080£ the baaing point 8,.8tem., there 1s additional 1nean .. 
tlve for newcompanl.". to construct new facilitie8, or to 
add to exl,ting plants the :tacl11t1esfor tb .• production 
ot .tesl products not tormer17 produced in this area. It 
• ne. compan7.or an.exl.t1ngoompan7. decided to construct 
.fa c111t 18S torprodu et ion ot some of these items, th.,. could 
be relatively certain tbat the prioe tor tb.e same product 
from Eastern productioncentera would be comparativel,. high. 
This would be because of the transportation coats f':rom the 
East or K14-"'G.t to the Far west. ThuI, it the new company. 
or old company with new facillties. ha,d high production 
coata ro~ the tirst .8' •• ral lears, the,. could atill be com. 
parat1ve17 certain that their market would not be invaded by 
East'ern producers because of the fre1,gbt dUterence. Such 
invasion was, of cour •• , poa.1bl.e under the basing point 
8.,atemon a fre1ght .. b.o~ptlon basts. It ahould be borne 
in mind, however,. "that in no ca.8e OIlll the price charged by 
the western producer be higher than the Eaaternprlee plu8 
tre1ghttrom the East since the Eastern produoers could m-
vad .• the market it this were the case. It 1" a"pparent 
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tbatthe PJ'ice to ••• ternconaumera of atee'1 produeedin the 
Eaat, or Mid .... at exclusively at present,mlgb:t b.hlgher by 
the· tUIGUint o·f freight absorption carried ,o'n while the basing 
po1nt.wa.s in us., but the .potent1al long-range effect 18 the 
•• tab11ehment of facilities 1n the W.at to.X' the produotion of 
the.e item., and ult1matt)l,. lower prices.. Theravorab·le com.· 
b1natlon of r.source. 1n Utah make 1t a l1kely spot toptutura 
construction or theae addedfac111t1e8. 
",v 
The argument moat f2l'equ.ent1,' used by advocate. ot t,be 
baahis po1nt a·7ste. 1& that ita abolition w111 make posaible 
a situation wbe:r •• very1aolated producer can oharge rata-
t1v,l,.hlgber prioel to those consumers, located near b18 
plant. Th1su po.s1bl .• ,lt 1& a.rgued, because each mill 
w111 be protected by a ... 11 ot freight rate. from competi-
tion b,. more distant •• 118rl.1 This, of course, would. be a 
vep., unde.Utable development since 1t woul.d constitute 8 
reduction in competition among producer.. Therefore, the 
argument Nfl •• the el1mination of baaing point prlc1ng doe. 
not make tor competition in the steel industry, bu.t will 
have quite tn. opposite erfect. It create. a aerie. ot 
local monopolies. 
Tbuargament overlooks many 8ign1tlcant considerations. 
In the first· place, the ateel industry has in paet ,..ars been 
cbaracterlledbylong perlods of excea8 capacit.,. tfhua, during 
the 192018, the utilizat10n ot capacity averaged only 71.6 
per cent. Durin, the decadeo·f the 19ZQ t s. tbl. tigure tell 
to 48.3 per cent, and..a late as 1946. onlY' 72.5 per oent 
"a.8 being utilized althoughtb1a figure ha, risen to near 
100 per qent since tbatt1me.2 i'hu$, in the past, therehaa 
• 
1. In an interview with: .A. Wood,V1ce.Prea1dent in Charge 
oraalee of the Utah Idaho Sugar Company, th1a argument 
was the one principle used to support theexlatence of 
basma; point pricing in the 8ugarinduatry" ct. also, 
T.l'I.E.C. Monograpb 42, p .•. 82. 
B. Adams ,2£. c~~:r., PI'. 176-' a. 
.,. 
usual17 be •. n a slgn1tloanta.IlOUIl't of pre.aure on the avenge 
steel produceX' to.spane! bu •• l.. 1n aneftort to utl1be 
his capaelt7more etfectlve17. It t'h1e condition ot exc ••• 
capacit" returna 1n the future. and. it oerta.1nly bas an 
excellent chanee ot doing. eo"the individual produ.cer w111 
ap1n be anslou8 to expand aalea, and utilue hi. capac!t,. 
to tbe gr.ateat extent pos8ible under the cOnditions of 
tho future market. Even it he: ~. acomparatlvaly18olated 
producer, he wl11attempt to expand his aale. area it be 
18 f'aoedw1th.8xeea8 capactt,._ The on1,. w.,. the sa18. area 
can be expanded under an t.o.b. mill p~1c1ng system. 18 tor 
the producer· to lower hil pr1ce.8 by an amount sufficient 
to attract ~7.r. from the peripher'1 ot a. rival sellers 
market terrltory. It this 1. done, the local consumers 
11'111 sbare 1n the pr1ceredu·ct1on extended to the dietant 
oonsumers and the effeot w111 be that altho~gb tbe isolated 
pli'ociucer in fact does bay. a monopo17 in tn. immediately 
adjacent market are •• the prio. to these consumers m.lght verJ' 
well be lower than those whicb would obtain under the baa1ng 
po int 8:rst, ••• 
If, on the other band, the 180 la ted mill 1. 100& ted in 
an area. which 18 deficient ineteel prod.uotion .facilitie. 
80 that the1mmed.1atel,. surround1ng area more than consumes 
the output ot this isolated. mill. there .111 be no pressure 
on this seller to lower his priceeand expand hia marketa, 
Under these conditione, the local consumer m1g)1t honestly 
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be at the mere,. ot the onl3" producer in the ar.a. Even it 
thi. situation occurs, ttl •• t111po881ble that st •• l p%"lc,. 
w111 be a8 low or lower than under the basing point If.t •• 
because of decre.a.dcosta 1n transportat1on due to the elim-
ination of cross-hauling and the d1aappearance of non-ba •• 
mills.1 It 18 oonce:Lvablethat being at the merey or one 
mill mlg)lt be preferable to being at the mercy O.t fA whol. 
industry united 1n oine prlce.S lt the leola ted mill did, 
however, fix its price. to the local consumers at a very 
high level, this should be only a temporary condition. If 
this isolated mill cont1nuedto make unusual protltsover' 
any cO.na1d.erable period •. other producers would oer'tainl,. 
be attracted to this area. and in time, thepr1ce would tall 
to a more reasonable level. It should be recognized. that 
the large inveatment neeelaar,. for steel production might 
delay thi8 adjustment tor 8ometime, however. 
Tbe Geneva plant quite definitely .falls into the first 
of thea. two p.o8albl.' a.l'ua.tlon.. The Geneva Plant is com., 
paratlvel,. 1aolated geographically, and doe. not bave anyth1ng 
approaching $utr1c1ent demand In the local market to allow 
neareapacity operation,._ It would be ridiculous, theretore, 
to argue that the new pricing system bas put the local con .. 
8umers at the mercy ot the Geneva Plant in the matter of 
prices. If the management of tbe Geneva Plant attempted to 
P , JI 
1. Bond, ~.clt., p. 58. 
2. "U.S.. ·a8nIt Pt-lcea.,"·Fortun .. , xlII (1936), p. 136. 
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ra18. their price. to tbe local bttJfJ"I.and con •• qu.nt17 to 
the Pacific CO •• , bU,-era, the plant would. 10 •• a great de.l 
alit. Pac1tlc eoa.t market eltbfn;- to pro·d.u08:ElB on the 
pac1ticcoas't or to EIl.tern seaboard··producer.. Selling to 
bUyers on the Pac1t1cOOaat at a price below tbe p7ice to 
local bUrel's plus freight totheOOast is forbidden. by S80-
tion! ot the Clayton Act a,s amended b7the RObinson-Patman 
Act, as being price d1sor1m1na.t1on injurious to competition. 
Therefore, the local consumers must participate in an,. price 
conce8810·na to Pacific coaat consumers, Of course, there 1s 
alwaye the poss1bility that the producers who supply the 
we.tern market ml~t fix price. !nooneert, but.ven if this 
oeoupred, there 1s no reason to bellev. that the re.ultant 
pplce would beat a highs'%' level than the basing point 
price. Also. tbls could scarcely be consideped as being the 
result ot the abolltlon otthe ba,.1ng po1ntIY8tem. COn-
trary to the etfect of creating a 10ea1 monopoly in eve17 
isolated steel producing a..rea, the a,d,option of t.o.b.ml11 
pr1eing w111 have the effect 1n most a:a.-ea. ot guaranteeing 
the local buyers against monopoly pricing. Certainly. it 
appears tba t this will be the· outcome in l1tah. 
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'lHE BrFlCT ON PRICES 
!here aI". aeveral "flalone toeuspeat that the abolition 
of ,tbe balmg point system wIll not brine with it prlcecom. 
, , 
pet1t1on1n. the st •• l indultr,., either in the we.t or elee-
wbere. The first of tbeeereaeona iatbat the demand for .,.el 
1s probably relatively 1nela~t1e .. "bleh means that n·o s.1gnit. 
lcant expansion of marketa'1s possIble as tbe Xiesult 0.£ indus-
try.w:l.de price cuts. Thb 1nele.st1clty of demand 'to"!! etee'l 
products probably results :in part from the tact that these 
products are usuall,. used for further production. That 1a, , 
most steel demand lsd.rived .. or secondary demand. At lea.st 
tbis seems to be the case with tbe products produoed at the 
Geneva plant. steel 18a180 ebaraeter1zed by a lack of sub-
stitutes and there are not man)" things tor which steel can be 
substituted. This means that price cuts in steel w111 result 
1no'nl:r a minor increase 1nthe amoun.t demanded tor su.bstl-
tu tion 1n man)" ca.88a. 
The amount or steel contained as ra.w materla.l in a 
t1n1shed product is, of course,ot pr1marysie1l1ticance 1n 
determining the elasticity or demand Qf a particular buyer 
who uses 1t1n f'urthel!' production. General17 speaking, the 
proportion of tbetotal eO$t to the coat or the eteel:ln the 
finished product will vary inversely-with the bU7ers elastic-
ity ot demand. Thus, if 'the cost of eteel 18 a minor part of 
the total coate, tbedemand 18 11kel'yto be les8 elastic 
than would be the case it steel COlts were a large part ot 
the total COltl. It an average price per pound of 3.50 ctnt. 
tor all steel p:ttoducta 1, .a,umed. the tollow1ng 1e. 118t of 
the total east otateel used in some :rather common artiel ••• 
Th •• pprox1:mate cost of the steel in an electric refrigerator 
1s $6.(2) in. typical passenger automobIle, $124.041 1tl a 
typical farm tractor, $64.001 in a modern a1xroom bouse, 
$296,S7, and in a railroad freight car, $1610.00. 1 It can 
besesn from thieverY' incomplete l1at, that tbe elast.lc1ty 
or demand tor varioue producers or goods in 'Which steel. 1. 
uled a8 a raw material might be subject to rather widevari-
ation a8 the result of the relative 1tnportance of the coat of 
steel to, tbe total costa. 
For the purpoaes of this ana17811, however,. it may beot 
more s,1.gnltlcan.ce to ascerta.1n tbe effects of a change in the 
price of steel on the coats of pl'oduc.1ng commod1ties which 
us. ita. a raw material. It 1s 1n this connection that the 
relative unimportaneeot eteelprieecbanges to many conattmers 
can be most clearly seen. For example: 
" ••• under 1948eondltions, a $5 per ton ohange in the 
price 0.£ all steel products going into a $1,500 auto-
mobil. 'Wouldatfect . thecoBt of producing the automo .. 
bile about $8; a $20 electrio toaster would be affected 
by lesl than one cent; a $28S electric refrigerator b7 
1.''1'0 arrive at the approxhate pr1ce of .teel per pound, price .• 
of selected steelprod.ucts per ton were taken from: "Basic 
Data Relating to Steel Prioes," 81 Dong. end Se88.PUbllahed 
by the Joint Committee, (Washin.gton, 1950). pp. 11.,16-31. 
These figures .ere divided througb 'by the number or commod-
it lea and this figure was then divided by one ton to set 
the approximate price per ton. This price was then multi-
plied by" the number of pounds of steel used in the various 
product. to d,etermine the approximate cost or the steel 
used in each. lfo attempt has been made to include freight 
costs or extra.. In lome cases these might make a consi-
derable difference in the final cost or the steel used. 
GleentsJ a 0184 galll'anp' b,.49' .centil, and _$130 
alhingmachine b7 ~5cent8wh11e tbe cost ofb1l1ld-
inS .. ,35ator1 .teel"tra.e office building would be 
att"otad bV s1x.,ten.ths ·of one per cent.,tll 
For some other th,1nga in.bleh more steel is used the .a.tfeot 
of aprioe chan.gewould be greater but in almost every case, 
the .,tto'ct ot a price change in steel on the tota'lcoat of 
the commodity is comparat'lvely small when compared w1thtb.e 
tins'l .alepr1ce. 
In addition to the inelasticity o·t demand. torst'el, 
the industry is Characteri!8d by a b1gbdegree otconeentra-
tlon. A stud,. of annual eteelcapae1t1ea as of January 1, 
1949. showed that the twelve largest steel e011lPan16! con'trolled 
93.69 per centot the DUtputot stoel ingot., 88 •. 18 per cent 
ot pig iron capacitY', and 82.66 per cent of the fac111tlee 
tor finished bot-rolled steel.2 The sltu·f1't1on in the Western 
steel markets.. one of even more concentration with one 
oompan,-, the United states Ste,.l CQrpora.tion" controll1ns 
39 per cent of all steel capacitY' an.d 51 per cent ot the 
capacitY" tor .• teel 1ngot •• ~ Add to the capacity in the Welt 
owned by the United state. st.tl Corporation that owned b7 
the Bethlehem steel Corporation and the KaUer Steel Compan7. 
andpractlcal17all steel capacitY' !nth. Welt 1. accounted 
for., There are some email independent producers 1n the west 
bUt they are dwarfed by eompar1llonw1th the three big eompan1 ••• 4 
1. Adams. 22.~ e1t." I P. 1 '70. '.. 
2. American Iron and steel Institute. Dlrectorlot Iron and 
steelworks, of the Unit-eel state.a.nd dinada. (!9:tB) 
S. Adams. OPi.eC1t;~ P. mo. · 
4. Sullivan ',' MrJ MahoneY' • .22,_clt., Part I, p. 71. The 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Compan7-nant at Pueblo .18 omitted 
beC8u.IG ltdoe. not aerve the same general market a8the 
above mentioned companies. 
D\I 
The wI.tern.teal induatrl1a an excellent e:xample ot a.n 
011gopo111tio industr,.. There are a few .,.1181" ota homo-
geneous product, and ever7seller must cons1dertbe action ot 
all others.1181's when be changes ht, price. (see fig. 11). 
This makes steel prices "at icky·· and given to les8 frequ.ent 
changea than would be the .... it the steel market were com-
petlt~ve, It can be ahoYllit.hat in t he past, steel prices have 
fluctuated relatively 1e,. than Iteel output and employment. 
(s.e tig. 12). A1Go, thatateel prices ha.va tended to fluc-
tuate relatively 1 ••• than prices of commidltl •• produced 1n 
... 
1ndust1"1 •• characterized by a smaller degree ot centraliza-
tion of control, (8ee tig. 13). These characteristics ot 
the ateel tnduatry 1tlt\8t be considered wben ananalys1a ot 
the etrect ot a new pricing pollc7ia attempted. 
When the baaing point system was abandoned in July, 
1947 I the immediate .trect wa .• an increase in price. Most 
wrlterson the subject a grEta that man,. mills had set their 
base prices under the baaing point system at a level high 
enough to allow tor 80me treight absorpt1on. 1 It this were 
the case, then tbe log1cal outcome or abandoning the delivered. 
pricing system should bavs been to lower the t .0. b. mill 
price. 'b7 the amount of the coat deerea •• occa81oned b.,.. the 
I , 
1. ef. Ma chlup # 0ia cit., p. 7S,Oorw1n D. Edwards, "The Effect 
ot the Recent . 81iig Point Deo181ons on Bu.in ••• Practice.,· 
American Economic Revie. , xxxviii (1948);- p.. 839; Norman 
1'07, "'fl"l. Ea.ental. ol'the steel Produ cera t Right to 
compete," Delivered pr101n~apd the Future ot American 
Busm ••• , 6.8. Chimber or '.' mmerce, (wasii1i1gton j 1919), 
p. 118. 
0' 
~t{anfi r cP 
.OLIGOPOLY. Partial control OftI' a ooaaodity price ~ • tn 
•• 11eN aoUDI to 10_ extent as a group. Bach .. 11erua hi .. 
• eU wba" Win be the .tt.at or hie action on the bahaY10r o.t the 
other •• 118"'_ It th. pNCluot- lahOJlOpnoWt, a prlceout .~ OM 
•• 11e .. "1' ntault. in price oute 'by the o\hers. • •• Under olif.fOPDlY'. 
ou\put doell', not respond t_dla .... ly to attltta in t.he marginal. oo.t 
cur.... .. 1n Lh. ca.. of .,nopo11st1c oompet4 tloD where each tim 
dieNI_de the aotion of other tirms ••• " Byrne J. Horton. Julien 
Ripl.;y, and }i.a. Sobnapper. Dictionary of Modem Eoonomic8, (Wuh-
ineton, 191,8) p. 2hS. 
The line n,l.ll', "prenn'" the cha~ter1.U,c demand curve tor 
a tina operating In an oligopo11atic ark.t. '!be • .-nt D,X, 1. 
relat1wly elaatio, the "paint. lin'. 1. relatively 'in.lattc. The 
price uader the aboV8111uwated condItions would be at point P, and 
tile MOunt deunded, at point Q.. Tho kink in the demand eu.rve ari __ 
troll the tact that 11 the produc:er :raises hi. price, it 18 likely that 
tbe otherpJ'Oducerawill not follow the price lnereaae. Thue, it he 
rat ••• hi. price, he doea so on the .1 .. \10 8~Amt of hie demand 
OUMf8.. Ttli. _ana that his total reoelpta aove in the oppo8ite direc-
t1ontrom 'tJle prl.o.. ()1 the other hand, it he lowe" hi,. price, he 
expects the othe~ p'rodueera who .hare bie market to lowe1* their price. 
by an .wn gr •• ter amount so that h18 reduction tn pri.ce w111raault 
in a le.8 than proportional. loora_ in the number of unite he can 
.aU. This 1. tatamount to aa;yinl that. It he lower. hie price, he 
do •• 80 on the 1.nelaat1c •• pent of bi. demando\U"'N. It this 18 the 0_, hie total reee1,pt8 will now move in the ... direotion as hi. 
prIce, or down. Tltu. •• 1.t 11 eaaUy .een, t.bat given the above con-
ditione, the individual producer can MXi!91 •• hi. ~t.al receipt. only 
at the point wbe" the other tt",. in hie market area he". aet the 
price, at the point wheN the deund ourw 1.8 kinked. The prlee tend. 
to be -"ticleT' at thle point. 
The oon ten t.1 on i.) that under the baalnf( point system of pricing, 
t.htl t:ype dellMd CUM" for the individual producer •• ems 11kely to 
occur. U.!ng b •• in« potn"t8, reta11a.tory action aga1net a price CU'\·.r 
1. re1at1_17 .illPle through the _diu. of d • .t~ating h1splant .. 
a punitive baaing point. on the other hand. since every!illl11 quote. 
ident.ioal price. to anygi"Yen buyer, an attempt by one buyer to rai .. 
hie price above the preftUingba81ng point price i, rutile 8ince the 
buyer bu limply' to n1 tch to anoth ... 8upplS.er at the old lower price. 
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el1mbla'tloD of net tX'elght ·Ilbaorptlon,. Wot, on.17dSd this 
fa.l1 to happen, but manrml11a raised their pri:ce8 and blp,11e4, 
that 'higher priees and hlgherml11 1"ealllatlo'o.were now re-
quired bY' 18 •• 1 The obviouapurpoBe of thisactlon ••• to 
conv1nce th. bu7era of ateel,and the publl.c ,in general. that 
1twaato their beat interest. to oppose theaband.onment ot 
the baaing point 8ystem.Also, the priM increase was long 
overdue ainoe steel price.'" had not changed. 8ince the War and 
thepr1cea of nearly all other eommodlt1EuI, 1nclud.1ng tboa. 
which used steel as a 'basler •• material, bad gone up by 
various amounta.2 The demand tor steel a.t thlat1mewaa 1n 
excela ot supply_ Accord1ng to. one Ylr'lter,5the price r1.e 
was pa:r-t ota v1.goroua oampaign to g.t Congress to •. mend the 
law and legalize basinS point pricing_ 
The Geneva plant, in line with the general policy in the 
steel industry. raised its prices when th.e change over to t .o.b. 
,4
1 mill pr.ioing was made •. It wou d be difficult. it not impossible, 
to 8a7 whether or not the pr.iceot Geneva producte under the 
baaing po1nt .".tam had been high enough to, allow tor lome net 
frelg)1t absorption, The mill had been operated a8 a private 
concern tor a compara.tlve11 short t:tm. and. the demand for ateel 
bad been 1n exceS8 of the supply for the ent1ret1me oeneva 
was a baaing point, On the one band thedletan.ee fromfleneva 
ad 1 
1. Ifa.eblup, p. c1t.,p_, 72. 
2. n,Sd.. an ' many others. 
3.00"11'1 FAwards ,l loc. cit., P. 837. Also otbers. 
4. Economic Inst1tu~e, or. cit. p. 169. (statement made b7 
K.T. Norris, presiden', Woprb stamping and Manufacturing 
Compan'1 ... Welt coast Firm.) 
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to the •• at coast,. w'bleb i,·an outlet tor I10st Qenevapro-
duct., would .uggeat tbattbeba.e price at Gentva •••• et 
~at a point which would allow for net tz-e1ght absorption. 
,On the other hand, however, the favorable, position of tbe 
oeneva Plantwlth reterenceto raw materialaascompa.:redw1th 
tb.e 'West !coa,at producers might suggest tbatthe price could 
be.et <a.t Geneva without.ilowanae for n.et freight absorp-
t10nand .till allow profitable operation. In anycaee, 
the price increased when the basing po1ntaystem was aban-
doned. considering the degreeot concentration of control 
in theW.stern steel 1ndu8tr7and tbefactthat at the time 
the change 1npr1cingpolicyw8.s made demand was 1nexc8ss 
or capacity. it doe. not eae. unrfUlsona,ble to aS8umethat 
the price increaae on products produQedat aeneva could ver7 
e •• 117 ha V'. been tl'le resul tot eons1del'a.t ions othel' than 
the geographical pricing policy. A tactual stud10t the 
etfect of the changed-policy on! tbe price. orst.al produced 
at the Geneva Plant will have to wait until such time as the 
demand for steel decline,. and the sellers market tor steel 
is gone. 
The very conditions which make the price for steel 
sticky and subject to 1nfr.quentChllngea, can 1n the ab.enoe 
ot control or co-C)perat1on among the producers, g1ve,rise 
to the opposlt8etfect. The tact that ateel 18 used 181'g&l" 
m furtber productlve processes indicate. tbat most purchases 
8fJ· 
. are ma·de in ratherlarseamoun't. by bU1lr •• ho are verr •• ,ll 
1ntormed concerning .rt.el:p .. lc..... Thllmlght. make th •••. lea 
curve of the individual at.,el, producerextremel,. elastIc 
belo. the ma,rlcet price. (See t1g. 14). Th. tear of ret.1-
.latory prIce cutting 18 av,,:ry important tactor in making 
the price tor ateel 1nfle~ible. (That is,lt there 18' no 
control or co-operation among tbe producers.) Itfollows 
then, that any- prlce polle71fb~Cb made tbepo8s1b1,llt7 ot 
retaliator)" price cutting lass likely would prov1dean 
incentive to ,lower. pri,eea. This would be part1cularl,. true 
U tbe demand fQr steel weresucbbhat only a fraction of 
producing capacity were being utilized. The baaing point 
1 
system almoatcerta1nly oentralized control, and made reta,l-
iatory act1on·Q comparativel,. simple matter.. It a ml1l cut 
prlce. below the established baaing point price, it was com-
paratlvelr ea87 tor the rest of the producer. to make tbis 
mill • punitive basing point w1thlower-tban-cost price •• 
With this arrangement, all other mills would sell in the 
price-cutting mill"a market territory at 1.8sthan coat with-
out mucbharm to them,8lvea since no oneml11 would b.'sellmg 
any large percentage of its products in tb1s a;rea. The p.riae-
cutter. on the oth.er hand would be forced to sell in h1aown 
territory at the redUC6d price or in other market areas on 
1:. smithies, Fetter, Edwards,; Pegrum, JifilClllnp, and nearly all 
other economistaand some bu.1neaamen wb.o have written on 
tbe subject agree tbatthis 18 the o&se. (All above authors-
works on this topic have been cited previously intbia paper.) 
8'1 
D' 
Assuming a marketaervedby a tew sellers ot a homogenous pro-
duct, but in whioh the indi.rldual seller is' not afraid ot price 
retaliation. Assuming further, that in this market, there 1s no 
collusion, either overt or tacit, among the sellera. Also, in this 
market, the buyers ot the product are for the most part purChasing 
for further productive uses, and purchasing the product on a compar-
atively large scale. In other words, assuming that the buyeraare 
.... 11 informed as to the prices quoted by the various producers serv-
ing the market in question. 
Givan the above market condi tiona, the individual producer could 
greatly eXpand his output by lowering his price below I, the price 
of the other sellers serving this particular market area. Since the 
seller does not expect retaliation in the form of further price cuts 
by his principal com.petitors, he can lower his price and greatly ex-
pand his sales. The principal reason the individual seller in the 
a.bo," market illustration lYouldbe faced 'With a relatively elastic 
demand curve beloW' the price point I, 1s the fact that the buyers 
he supplies are very well informed 8S to the prices offered by all 
possible suppliers, and are buying in sufficient quantity to make 
even a comparatively small price change important. On the other 
hand, if this seller raised his price, he would. be faced with a 
sharp reduction in the amount he could sell tor the same reasons as 
he can increase his salessharpl,. below the market price. 
The contention i8, that this type of demand curve for the in-
dividual producer has a bette.r chance to occur in the absence ot 
the baaing point system than ifth1s system is being used. This 
should not be construed to mean that this type dem.and curve will 
be the inevitable outcome of the adopti.on of f'. o. b. mill pricing. 
On the contrary, this 8eems rath.er unlikely. The inherent instab-
illty of a market situation such as that illustrated above should 
be recognized. Every producer in the hypothetical market is laced 
w1 th this type demand curve J hence, every producer haa incent! va to 
lower his price below the prevailing price. This could very easily 
lead to ruinous competition Which, it seems likely .. would ultimate 
in 80me sort of collusion among the sellera. 
FIGURE 14 
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• freight ab.orptlon ba&18. leither "tthe.e alternatlv •• 
wott14 'be very inviting and. the price-cutter would probably 
raise hia price back up to theestabllabed level. Under an 
f.o.b. mill pricing s1'etem, however. reta.liato!'" prioe Cutting 
would not be so ea87_ Ira certa1n mill'. pric •• w.r~ lowered 
in its ownmarke, area, tbe on17 •• 7 retal.1at1onc()uld take 
place would be it mill. located neartb18 producer lower.d 
their f.o.b. mill priceato 8. level so low that transporta-
tion eoststo the price-outter'. territory plus their mill 
prices would be below the price set by the price-cutter. 
The retaliating mills could not keep prices in their own 
market t.·r:r1tory up to the p1'6v.loul level since this would 
constitute price d18cr1m1na.tlon and. would be clearly illegal 
under Seetlon 2 or the clayton Act as amended. ThU8. the 
retaliating producers would find that tbey had chosen" very 
expensive cours. otaetlon, and it 18 qU8.8t1onable whether 
retal1atory pr.1cecutting would occur. The proponent. ot 
the basing po1nt87atempoint out that tbe method. of puni-
tive action against a price-cutter deacr1bed above W.8 never 
used while the steel industry was pricing on a dellvered 
bas1a. This seems ,to be the trttthtbut the fact that such 
action was po.albl. would certainl,. discourage an,. contem .. 
pl.ated'price cute. This analys1.aapp11e. to the Vlestern 
steel 1nduatJ'Y aa .ell 8S to any other seotiQn of the united 
states. 
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It should be empba.u,,4tbat price-cutting under 'be 
t.o.b.m1l1 pric1n,g 87.t:~.,~. just easier than it.auld bt 
unde.r a basing point system-. This does not mean tM.t p~10. 
cuts will be tIle inev1t.:ble o'Q,tpowth of the ne. prlc1ng 
arrangement. Pric.cu.tsw111oQcur only where the steel 
producers are 80 a1tua.ted that no; producer in the aameor 
very nearly the same ar •• can retaliate. Wha.t is even more 
hnporta'nt,ther w11l occur only s.t tbe producers 1n anY8rea 
act 1ndependen,tl.y instead or tacitly agreeing on a pr10e polioi' 
in their area. Tbe fact tbat Western steel capacity 18 highly 
concentrated in the hand,s or a few Eastern companl.a make. the 
probabl11.t,. that there will be widespread price cu.ts in the 
W •• tern market more unlikely than would otherwise be the OIUJ •• 
Further iplpetu8 should be given to price reductions for 
steel products b7 th.edeeentrallzing effect ot the new pricing 
policy aa mentioned 1n a previous .ection of th18 paper. 1 It 
more independent plants are set up closer to the 'mark.tout-
let •• the redu.et1on 1n transportation coats as trell 88 the 
added competitive infl'uence sbould stimulate price J;\eductlona. 
Also ,anyexceaaco,ta1nyolved 1ncro'8-hau linS and use o.t 
other than the cheapest means ot transportation should be 
elim1nated and tbe r •• ultan.t savings could be passed on in 
the form of lower pr1oe,B. The seller couldpaa8 the •• coat 
reductions on to the conaumez- without a, net change1.n tbe 
price he received. ThuI, t~o.b. mill pr1cingahould encour .. 
age price reductione because of savings in coat. which would 
• 
90 
reaultunder the 878tem.;, Wb..theX' tb1a outcomt ,,111bfZ'e.l. 
uedin the futurer.ma~JI'.t;Q be.een, but it eeemerath.:r 
obvious that uniform f.o.'b:,l!Jl11 pricing provide. a better 
opportunity for low at,eel price. than would be the OIl •• 
undera delivered pJ'iclngI18tem. 
Act'llal17, when appl3.;oat1on otthe above analYllI 1s 
made to ,the Geneva Plant, it becomes apparent tbat theetrect 
w111 be leas than hlma111,other areas and to man". other plarrts. 
The existence of &ueh lars. capacities at the Geneva Plant 
makes it unlikely tbatother plants w111 be encoura.ged to 
locate in this imme;d1ate area tor some time to come. Of 
course, 1f the demand for B:te.l on the Pacific Coast Con .. 
tinU8S to grow at the rate experienced through the past tew 
year., 80me additional capacity w111 have to be a.dded to the 
western atee,l industry in • comparatively ahort time. Th1a 
capacity might verrwell locate in utah, but it would be 
becaus8 ot the proximity to raw materials ratber than as a 
result of a changed pr1.cing policy. 
The Geneva Plant will not experience an,. great •• vini 
in coats as a, result of th •• 11rn1nat1on ot croaa-'baul.1ng 
since the amount of steel Boldin utah is very small. This 
means that even. if' other producers 1nvadedthe Utah market. 
the amount of wastefuloro8a,--baul.1ng would be of minor 81e11!-
lcanee. FUrther, the Geneva Flant wou.ld probably not bave 
Bold any significant amount in the Eastern or even ltldwW •• tern 
united stat ••• ~.n it thlba.s1ng polntayatem war. allowed. 
ThU. , no waat.tularosl-hauling would have occurred to and 
from these areas. 
Final17, the absence of an,. large bodie" ot ".,ter 
between the Ge,neva Plant and ita princlp.alma,rket outlets 
makes it extremely unlikely that much saving will accrue as 
the result of using cheaper transporta.tion. 
There 1s one othertmportant effect on price which 
should be cons1dered. That 1s that the local consumers w111 
be gttaranteed a share in any price out to an,. part of R pa.r-
t1cula.r producer'. market. For example, 1f the United states 
steel Corpora t 10n had wished to lowe%' the pr1.ce otsteel on 
the Paoific, COast whtle the basing point system was being 
used., the,. could have done one or two things. Either the 
baa. pr.1ceat ,Geneva could have been lowel'ed, or a new baling 
point for the products could have been established at one 
of the Columb1a steel Company Plants on the COast, If the 
base prices at the (leneva Plant had been lowered, the st •• l 
consumers 1n Utah would have shared 111 the pr1ce reduction. 
If the other alternative bad been tollowed; however, the 
price reduction could take place on tho Coaat without any 
price change occurring in the Utah market. Under the present 
prl.c1ng system, any reduction in priceeof ('len.va made pro-
duct8 on the eo •. at must also be a reduction 'in the local mar-
ket. Thus, the new pricing system guarantees the local eol'!-
sumeraahare in ~n7 price decline ,which occurs on the 
products ot a par" lcular ,lutt., 
One wrlter.ultlDed. up th •• tract or the ne. polio7 with 
regard to compet'itlon ti,nd prides as tollow •• 
"The difference betweenmar'ketcompet1tlon under 
f.o,b. mill pr1cine; (wltbstr1ctly (lel1naated 
max-kat areas) a.nd. under d1scriminatol'Y deliv-
ered. pricing 1s something like thed1tfepence 
bet •• en trench wartareand guerilla.art ..... 
In the former. cas." allf1g)lt1ng takes place 
alons a def1nite battle lin .• , in the- second 
ease, the oppos1ngforcas a.re :intermingled 
over a broad are •• "l 
Il 
1. Edgar M. Hoover .. The Location ofli1e<?nom~e Activity, (Ne. 
York, 1948), p •• 51. 
SUJlABYANDCOICmS lOllS 
Siveral conlJ1deratlonapecul1arto tbe (Je·nt:va plan/t 
condition tho effects ot tht.bol1tton ot ba.1n.g point pricmg 
on tbl. firm. One of tbe moat important of the •• 18 the tact 
that the plant 1. 80 constructed that .some change in the pro-
portion' of the final product. 18 poa81ble. Tbat 18, the 
Iteel1ngota produced at tbeplant ma7 be either made into 
atruQtural shape. or 1ntoplate B.nd thinner than plate 
ga.age.. were it not to'lf th. p0881b111ty of changing the 
rela.tlve amounts of the •• two t7,P •• or semi-tinished .t.,l 
products produce4at the acme va plant. it .8oms likel,. 'bbat 
the change in prlc1nsmetboda might occasion lome curtail,. 
ment of production. We.tern eapacl.t,. to%'8tructural st.el 
1., at pre.ent, more than adequate to meet the demand. Under 
theba.!ng Points7atem, tb1. would cause the We.tern pro-
ducers t.o seek markets outaid.of tbe·l'estem area in which 
to dispose of their struotural steellurplua. The •• out-
side markets lIQuldbe .e,rved on a freight absorpt:l.onbas1a. 
or·course, this is not po.sible und.%" unitorm t.o.b .. mill 
pricing, and 80me capacit,. tor the production or this tn-
of seml .. r'1n1shed steel must laY' idle. In the ea •• of the 
oentva Plant .. this cut-bae:k in the production of etructural 
ste.l can be larp17 absorbed by increasing production of 
plate and thinner than plate steel. Therefore •• a X'egarde 
the structu.ral mill. it 8seme likely tha.t the 8 ... e pollcy 
1. b:.1ng tollowed under t.o.b. ml11pricing as would have 
" 
been to 110.,d under the baB1ng point 57atem, i.e •• production 
otlt,ruotural.t •• 'l bas largel,.. given •• 7 to prOduction of th. 
othort1P •• of .em1-t1nlahed.at •• l at. the (len.va Plant. 
The ,11;uat1on 11'1 theW.at wlthreprd to plate and thmner 
tbl..n plate rolled steel 18 qu.ite d1tterent from the structural 
situation. There seems to be demand tor the •• types ot 8 .ml~ 
f1nished st.el product •. sufflcient to allow tor effective 
utilization of ez1et1:n.g We.t."pncapaclt7_ The effect with 
reterence to tha.e st •• l products or the changed prl.1ng 
system w111 11ke1'y, therefore, be quit.d1tferent. In the 
first pla,ce,. uniform t.o.b. m1l1 pricing w111 eliminate the 
po •• lb:111tr ot market penetration b7some Eastern producers 
whloh would have been pos8.1ble under tbe baaing point system. 
Thus. the ettect of the changed. pricing polle.,- in th18 ca •• 
should be favorable to western steel produoers including the 
oeneva plant. 
Theettect ofaba.ndoning the basing po1nt system on the 
future location of .'eol producing facilities. in this region 
will be conditioned by the tact that the Geneva Plant ••• 
constructed to '.l'V8 wartime purposes and to till an extremely 
large wal't1me demand., The capacities of the Geneva Plant, 
therefor. I are more than adequate to supply demand which 
exlst. noworw1l1 probabl,.ex18t tor 80me time in the future. 
It 18 alao extremel,. difficult to .a,. what the effect on 
fu.ture location will be because of the large role played 11'1 
det.erm!n1ng locatlonot steel mill. by the avallabil1tyand. 
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extent of raw mater1als. It 18 conceivable that foreign 
,ourct. will bed18oovoredanddevelopedwh1ch .111.110" pro-
duc1l1ontobecarr1ed on at t1d •••. t.r on the Pacific Coaat 
".t a co.t whlchcomparea favorab17 w1th the coat. of pro-
duction at, Geneva. Becan •• the future' 1. 10 uncertain In 
the.e reapect ..... bout all that can be said 1. that the 
abol1tlon ot the basing point system w111 likely have the 
eftect of decentra11z!ng tuture .t •• l product¥n" and Utah 
might concelvab17 bea location alte tor some lot' this decen-
i 
./ 
tral1zed steel capacity. Ava 1la.bl11ty and extent of raw 
mat.rub will be ot more importance than the pricing 8,.stem 
lndeterm1ning thiS, however. 
The oonoentratlon of market outlets tor tabricated pro-
duct. on the Pac1tic COaat -.k •• it e"treJflel:r unl.1ke17 that 
thecbange 1n prlc1ng systems w111 have any significant 
effect on fabrication plant location in. the We.tern united 
stat.a.The fact that the rre1~t coats on the finished pro-
duct are senerall,. much h1£.iJler than those on the steel whicb 
goas into the product as a raw mater1al, makes it prof1table, 
in a preponderance of cae •• , tor the fabricator to locate 
•• near .s posaible to hi. market. It seemB unlikely that 
the change in pricing metbodswill have enough ettect to 
ma.kelocation awa7trom the tnarketmore prof.1table, parti-
cularly in the West where the market 18 80 highly concelltrated. 
The location of the Geneva plant with refere·nce ·to 1t. 
prinCipal markets make. It virtually impoIJ81ble for the local 
ateel conammera to be charged a 100111 monopoly prlec1 which 
1. hlgb.~ than the ,,%*'1.08 _hleh would prevail it the baling 
poln.t 'l.tem.ere in use. Toraiee the priGe to the local 
ateel consumers under the pr •• ent uniform f~o.b. m111pr1cmg 
871tem would mean tbat the price to the rest, and 1n the 
'. ca •• ot the Geneva Plant the vastly greater part of the mar-
ket, would have to be raised as well 8ine. federal law pro-
hibits discrimination inp'rlce bet •• en two market area. or 
consumers. Since the Geneva Plant w111becompet1ngw1th 
several producers on the West Coast, it 18 a virtual impossi-
bility that this w111 occur. 
It is w1thretorence to future steel prices that the 
changed pr1cing pollcy might well }Java some sign1ticant 
effects, both in Utah and elaewhere. In the first place, 
the decentralizing etfect of the new pricing method should. 
introduce elements: of competItion into the aale ot steel 
which m1ght not otherwise be present. The fact that the 
buyer. of steel w111 now bet:aeed w1thalternat1ve price • 
. trom difterent producers, wberea. they were faoed with a 
,mgl. prioe under tbebasing point system, should stimulate 
80me price competition which did. not previously exist. The 
possibilIty ot a steel produoer expanding tlie area ot hie 
sale. by price reductions, and the fa.ctthat uniform f.o.b. 
mill pricing makeaprlce retaliation more difficult· should 
add. to the p0881b111ty or mor.competition 1n price. It 
should not be presumed that the adopt1on of t.o.b.m111. 
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,priemg by the.te,el 1nduetr1wl11 Qutomatlcal11 make ;1:111 
a cOllPGtlt.ive indu.tr7,b.9wtl.er. Too manJ' otbercon.1dtr-
ationa are presGnt. TtleindustrY' 1. not compe't1t1ve in itl 
vfJ'1rrstruc,tu~.. and fl, chah$e1l'l geograpb,ical prlcepolle,. 
wl11certa1nly not alter1;bU. It would a180 be ,a.n error 
to assume that the change tot.a.b. mill prioing wl11 .auto-
matically result in lower steel prices. Here apin,· other 
considerationa might be paramount. There 1s, however, 
rea,eon to believe that the obangeto t .• o.b., mill pricing 
will have the ettect ot encouraging compet1.tion in pr'lce. 
and what 1s equall,. important,encourasing prioe flexibility. 
probably the most important conclus1onto be drawn 
trom this etudy lsthat it seems very unlike,l,- that the re-
8ults of the change in p:rlc1ngmethod w111 be world-aba.k.mg. 
This is not to say that there w111 be no effects, buttbat 
the results 1n the area und;er study w111 in all probability 
be 1888 significant OJ' pronounced than was widely antlcl ... , 
pated. Perhaps this situation is peculiar to this area and 
in other areas t it m1€pt be that the more .important effects 
predicted by writers on the sU''bject will occur. It may be 
allo, that the occurrence o.t'the change in pricing methode 
during a period of very high demand,. both fo'r .at.el and for 
fabricated goods, ba .• 80ftened the effect., had the change 
occurred 1n .. period ot weaker demand, the predictions ot 
the major1tyot writers on the subject would have been borne 
out. Or. it, may be_ that the conclusions arrived at in this 
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stud,. .111 proye to be too UndeI'8st1mated.i Only atte1' 
enough t1Dle haa elapeed tcenable 80m. emperleal s'tudlea 
tob. made, w111 tbet1nal word be 8.14. 
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